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INTRODUCTION
In May 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court set the stage for a
potentially remarkable shift in California criminal justice policy when
it upheld a federal district three-judge court 1 order in Brown v. Plata 2
requiring the State 3 to significantly reduce its prison population. By the
time the Supreme Court stepped in, California prisons held nearly
twice as many people as they were designed to house, despite a
decades-long prison construction boom. 4 The Supreme Court ruled that
this overcrowding subjects prisoners to conditions horrific enough to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment and ordered the State to reduce its prison population to no
more than 137.5 percent of design capacity. 5 The Court gave the State
1. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a district court judge, before
whom a prison conditions case is pending, may request the appointment of three-judge
court, under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284, if she believes that a prison release order should be
considered as a remedy in the case. 18 U.S.C. § 3226(a). Only three-judge courts have the
authority to issue prison release orders. Id. In Plata v. Brown, two district court cases were
consolidated, and in each of those cases the respective district court judge independently
requested a three-judge court be appointed. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1921. The Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit convened a three-judge court as prescribed by 18
U.S.C. § 3226(a) composed of the district court judges from the two consolidated cases and
a third Ninth Circuit judge. Id.
2. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
3. “The State” refers to the defendants in the Plata litigation: Governor Brown and the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
4. See SARA ABARBANEL, ET AL., REALIGNING THE REVOLVING DOOR: AN
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA COUNTIES’ AB 109 2011–2012 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (2013),
available
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Realigning%20the%20Revolving%20Door%20with%20updates
%20for%2058%20counties%20080113.pdf (“California has had prison overcrowding issues
since the inception of its prison system. The State created its prison system in 1851, and by
1858, six hundred prisoners were housed in an institution with only sixty-two cells.”) (citing
Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 52–53 (2008));
see also Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 259, 331 (2011); CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS,
PRISON FACILITIES, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Facilities_Locator/index.html
(demonstrating California’s massive prison construction between the mid-1970s through the
2000s).
5. 131 S. Ct. at 1923 (“For years the medical and mental health care provided by
California's prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional requirements and has failed
to meet prisoners’ basic health needs. Needless suffering and death have been the welldocumented result.”). “Design capacity” is the number of people each prison was
constructed to house. In its initial population-reduction order, the district court calculated
design capacity “based on one inmate per cell, single bunks in dormitories, and no beds in
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two years to shed approximately 33,000 prisoners. 6
In years past, California might have responded by building more
prison space. After all, the Plata order only required the State to reduce
overcrowding, not necessarily to reduce the actual numbers of people
imprisoned. 7 The State could theoretically “reduce” its prison
population to 137.5 percent of capacity by increasing capacity rather
than reducing the number of prisoners.
Given fiscal realities, however, that was not a politically viable
option. At the time the Supreme Court decided Plata, a twenty-five
billion dollar annual budget deficit, 8 fallout from the international
financial crisis and the housing market collapse had left California’s
state and local governments on the brink of fiscal disaster. 9 Instead of
undertaking new prison construction it could not afford, the State’s
plan to comply with the Plata order centered on “Realignment,” 10 a
legislative package drafted and pushed through the Legislature by
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.’s administration. 11 Described by
space not designed for housing.” See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population
Reduction Order at 8, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351).
6. California state prisons were designed to hold 79,858 prisoners. However, they
housed approximately 143,000 prisoners at the time of the Plata decision, which ordered
California to reduce its prison population by approximately 33,000 prisoners to 137.5
percent of design capacity, or approximately 109,800 prisoners. Id. at 1943–47; State
Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order Requiring a Reduction in Prison Crowding, CDCR
TODAY (June 7, 2011), http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2011/06/state-responds-to-threejudge-courts.html [hereinafter State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order].
7. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1941.
8. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 2011–12 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY, TO THE
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, REGULAR SESSION 2011–12 at 4 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2011-12-EN/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf
[hereinafter 2011–12 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY] (“California is projected to face a
budget gap of $25.4 billion in 2011–12. This gap is made up of a current-year shortfall of
$8.2 billion and a budget-year shortfall of $17.2 billion.”).
9. See CAL. LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2011–12 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL
OUTLOOK
(Nov.
10,
2010),
available
at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_2010.aspx
[hereinafter THE 2011–12 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL OUTLOOK]. The state budget
situation has improved considerably since the Supreme Court’s Plata ruling. See THE 201314 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL OUTLOOK, CAL. LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE (Nov. 2012),
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/bud/fiscal-outlook/fiscal-outlook-2012.pdf.
As discussed in more detail later in this Article, in September 2013 the California legislature
allocated hundreds of millions of dollars in new funding to marginally increase prison
capacity, through contracting with a private prison company and other measures, as part of
the State’s ongoing efforts to meet the 137.5 percent cap.
10. The official title of the act is the “2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public
safety.” A.B. 109, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
11. See S.B. 105, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (introduced Aug. 27, 2013);
MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON
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various commentators as “the biggest penal experiment in modern
history” 12 and as one of the most significant criminal justice reforms in
California since statehood, 13 Realignment diverted tens of thousands of
people annually 14—who previously would have been sent to state
prison for specified non-serious, non-violent, non-sex offenses—to
local supervision in county jails and alternative custody programs. 15 In
a codified statement of legislative intent, the Legislature declared that
criminal justice policies relying on building more prisons “are not
sustainable, and will not result in improved public safety,” and
encouraged counties to employ community-based rehabilitative
alternatives to incarceration for the realigned population. 16 The State
assured the public and the federal courts that Realignment would
reduce the prison population over the initially imposed two-year time
period through attrition; by sending fewer new prisoners in to replace
those being released at the normal conclusion of their sentences, the
POPULATION
CAP
(Sept.
4,
2013)
at
2,
available
at
http://lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2013/Federal-Court-Population-Cap-090413.pdf
(describing S.B. 105 as the Governor’s plan to addressing the prison population cap)
[hereinafter ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON POPULATION CAP].
12. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia and Jessica Greenlick Snyder, Looking Past The Hype: 10
Questions Everyone Should Ask About California’s Prison Realignment, 5 CAL. J. POL.
POL’Y
266,
266
(2013),
available
at
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/Looking_Past_The_Hype_Petersilia.pdf
13. See, e.g., Warren, Roger, Viewpoints: Realignment can Boost Public Safety,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/realignmentpublicsafety.pdf. The author is a
retired 20-year veteran of Sacramento County trial court and is President Emeritus of the
National Center for State Courts; see also DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL.,
RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP: CORRECTIONS 5 (Aug. 2011), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_811DMR.pdf (“California is changing the way it
manages its adult prisons and jails more comprehensively than at any time since
statehood.”).
14. California Realignment Dashboard, CHIEF PROBATION OFFICERS OF CAL.,
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/dashboard.swf (last updated Mar. 16, 2014)
(showing that, between October 2011 and September 2013, over 60,000 individuals who
would have been sent to state prison prior to Realignment were instead diverted to local
custody).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17.5(a), 1170(h) (West 2013); J. Richard Couzens and
Tricia Bigelow, Felony Sentencing After Realignment at app. 1 (Mar. 4, 2014), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/felony_sentencing.pdf (showing a list of the
realigned offenses). There are fifty-nine crimes that are not defined in the Penal Code as
serious or violent offenses, but are still served in state prison rather than in local custody.
See AB 109 Crime Exclusions List (July 22, 2011), available at
http://www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/committees/forensics/1107_forensics/ab
_109_crime_exclusion_list_(7-22-11).pdf (listing the non-serious, non-violent crimes that
must still be served in state prison).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a) (West 2013).
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prison population would drop enough to satisfy the Plata order. 17
As it turned out, the State was wrong. 18 At the time this Article
was finalized—nearly a year after the deadline originally set by the
court order—the State had still failed to sufficiently reduce its prison
population.19 After several intervening extensions, in December 2013
the three–judge court issued a new order requiring the State to comply
by February 2016, with intermediate benchmark requirements. 20 As of
April 14, 2014, the prison population was approximately 502 inmates
above first benchmark deadline of June 30, 2014, which requires the
population to be no higher than 143 percent of design capacity. 21
This Article analyzes the impact of the Plata decision and
Realignment at the three-year mark to assess whether California is
undergoing a criminal justice paradigm shift or, if instead, it is merely
shifting some of the state’s mass incarceration problem from prisons to
jails. We argue that the answer to that question is still unfolding and
will turn upon whether California’s political leaders are willing to
reform some of the harsh sentencing laws that caused the prison
overcrowding in the first place. We further argue that the most
significant political obstacle to such reform is opposition from the same
law enforcement interests that have obstructed legislative attempts to
reform the state’s sentencing laws for more than four decades.
The Article begins in Section I with an historical overview of the
prison and incarceration boom of the past forty years, explaining how

17. The Cornerstone of California’s Solution to Reduce Overcrowding, Costs, and
Recidivism, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/
(describing Realignment as “the cornerstone of California’s solution for reducing the
number of inmates across the state’s prisons to 137.5 percent of design capacity by June 27,
2013, as ordered by the Three-Judge Court and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court”).
18. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to
October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction at 2, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp.
2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351).
19. See Weekly Report of Population as of Midnight April 16, 2014, CAL. DEP’T OF
CORR.
&
REHAB.
(Apr.
16,
2014),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Weekly
Wed/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad140416.pdf (showing that the state is still above the court ordered
level of 137.5 percent capacity).
20. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of
December 31, 2013 Deadline, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No.
01-1351); Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for
Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal.
2013) (No. 01-1351).
21. See DEP’T OF FINANCE, SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT at 3 (Apr. 1, 2014),
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2014-15/documents/SB-105_ReportFinal.pdf [hereinafter SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT].
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California’s prisons became so dangerously overcrowded in the first
place.
In Section II, we describe the Supreme Court’s 2011 Plata ruling,
the litigation leading up to it, and the State’s initial attempts to build its
way out of the over-crowding problem.
In Section III we describe the Realignment legislation, including
its remarkable statement of legislative intent. We identify three
significant and related problems that have thwarted that legislative
intent and Realignment’s potential to usher in a new criminal justice
paradigm. 22 First, we argue that the legislation left counties too much
discretion to incarcerate the “realigned” population in local jails rather
than embrace the legislation’s focus on evidence-based alternatives to
incarceration. Second, the legislation failed to include sufficient
evaluation and accountability mechanisms. Third, the state formula for
determining how realignment funding would be allocated to the various
counties failed to sufficiently incentivize counties to incarcerate less.
Fourth, the Realignment legislation did nothing to address the problem
of excessive pre-trial incarceration in county jails. We argue that
because of these shortcomings Realignment in its current form has not
only failed to solve the prison overcrowding problem, but is also
exacerbating preexisting jail overcrowding problems that may lead to
further litigation and federal court intervention. We propose reforms
that can reduce pressure on local jail populations and incentivize
counties to utilize evidence-based alternatives to incarceration that
have been demonstrated to reduce crime by reducing recidivism. 23
In Section IV, we set out several significant political, legislative
and litigation-related developments that have occurred during the three
years since the Legislature enacted Realignment. We first discuss the
State’s retreat from its initial insistence that Realignment alone would
be enough to solve the prison overcrowding problem. 24 The State has
now explicitly acknowledged to the three-judge court and to the public
that, in fact, Realignment will never suffice to reduce the prison
population to 137.5 percent of design capacity. 25 We next describe a

22. See infra Section III.C.
23. Id.
24. See State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order, supra note 6 (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Secretary Matthew Cate stating, “AB 109 is
the cornerstone of the solution [to address overcrowding], and the Legislature must act to
protect public safety by funding Realignment.”).
25. See Defendant’s Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to Achieve
Required Prison Population Reduction at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal.
2013) (No. 01-1351); Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order,
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new legislative package the State enacted in September 2013, SB 105,
to supplement Realignment in reducing the prison population. 26 SB 105
includes the possibility of new funding that might help incentivize
counties to make greater use of alternatives to incarceration and send
fewer people to state prison. 27 The bill’s predominant thrust, however,
is to increase the State’s prison capacity through mechanisms that
include new authority and funding to contract with private in-state and
out-of-state prisons. 28 We then discuss the Plata three-judge court’s
February 2014 order granting another extension of the deadline for the
State to meet the 137.5 percent population cap, giving the State until
February 2016. 29 Unlike previous extensions, this order includes
significant new enforcement provisions the federal courts have never
before imposed in the long course of the Plata litigation. Perhaps most
significant is the appointment of a Compliance Monitor, who has the
authority to order prisoners released prior to the end of their sentences
if the State fails to meet intermediate population reduction
benchmarks. 30 In addition, the State stipulated that it would not appeal
any further orders of the three-judge court or the Compliance Monitor;
this concession by the State is especially significant given the previous
course of this decades-long litigation with multiple trips to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 31
In Section V, we argue that Realignment alone cannot shift the
criminal justice paradigm in California because it does not address a
fundamental cause of prison and jail over-crowding: the State punishes
far too many non-serious, non-violent offenses as felonies, and imposes
excessive sentences for them. We propose reforming sentencing laws,
supra note 5 at 2. See also Three-Judge Court Updates, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/3_judge_panel_decision.html (compiling updated figures).
This stark admission that Realignment alone was not going to be sufficient to meet the
court’s population cap requirement confirmed what the plaintiffs experts had already known
to be true. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response
to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18, at 2.
26. S.B. 105, supra note 11; CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 19050.2, 19050.8; CAL. PENAL
CODE. §§ 1233.1, 1233.3, 1233.4, 1233.9, 2910, 2915, 6250.2, 11191, 13602; 2012 Cal.
Stat. § 15, ch. 42 (Cal. 2013).
27. S.B. 105, supra note 11.
28. Id.
29. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension
of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2. This order is discussed in more detail
below.
30. Id. at 2; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’
Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3.
31. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of
December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3–4.
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including reducing the penalties for low-level non-violent drug and
property crimes, and explain the dramatic and sustainable impact these
sentencing reforms would have on prison and jail populations. 32 We
argue that these reforms are possible only if the State can overcome
political obstacles, most significantly an oppositional and influential
law enforcement lobby. 33 Two recent legislative examples are
presented which demonstrate that—despite pressures of the Plata
litigation and widespread public support for these reforms—lawmakers
have continued, even after Realignment, to capitulate to the wellorganized law enforcement lobby that has repeatedly defeated criminal
justice reform legislation over the past 40 years. 34
Finally, we conclude by arguing that even if the State can comply
with the three-judge court’s order, California prisons will still be
overflowing with tens of thousands more incarcerated than they were
designed to house. The 137.5 percent target represents only the
minimum prison population reduction necessary to satisfy the federal
court mandate. It is far from clear that this reduction will improve
conditions enough to end constitutionally prohibited cruel and unusual
punishment. 35 Even if so, this is a low bar. The standards for sound
criminal justice policy, effective corrections management, and basic
good government should be higher than simply meeting the bare
minimum required by the U.S. constitution. Complying with Plata
ought to be the beginning, not the end, of the conversation about
reforming the state’s criminal justice policies.
I.

FROM REHABILITATION TO RETRIBUTION: FORTY YEARS
OF TOUGH–ON–CRIME POLICIES

Over the past four decades, the United States has become the
world’s largest jailer. 36 With less than five percent of the world’s
32. See infra Section V.A.
33. See infra Section V.B.
34. Id.
35. See infra note 380.
36. See James P. Lynch & William Alex Pridemore, Crime in International
Perspective, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 5, 27 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds.,
2d ed. 2010) (“In terms of population-based incarceration rates, the United States is clearly
the most punitive nation in the world.”); CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 9 (May 2012), available
at http://www.usfca.edu/law/clgj/criminalsentencing_pr/ (This comprehensive comparative
analysis of sentencing and carceral practices in the U.S. and the rest of the world found that
“the United States has the largest prison population in the world and the highest
incarceration rate in the world. Never before have so many people been locked up for so
long and for so little as in the United States.”).
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population, 37 the United States incarcerates nearly twenty-five percent
of the world’s prisoners. 38 The United States has more people in its
prisons and jails than all of Europe combined, and more than China—
which has about one billion more people than the United States. 39
Harsh drug law enforcement and sentencing over the four decades—
since President Richard Nixon’s declaration of the “war on drugs” 40—
has been a driving force in the U.S. incarceration explosion. 41 There are
37. In 2012, the population of the U.S. was 313,914,040 people or 4.45 percent of the
worldwide population, totaling 7,046,368,812 people. See Population (Total), THE WORLD
BANK, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (last visited Jan. 2,
2014) (Population figures are based on “(1) United Nations Population Division. World
Population Prospects, (2) United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics
Report (various years), (3) Census reports and other statistical publications from national
statistical offices, (4) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, (5) Secretariat of the Pacific
Community: Statistics and Demography Programme, and (6) U.S. Census Bureau:
International Database.”).
38. See ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 (9th ed. Apr. 2012),
available at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf
(demonstrating that the U.S. houses approximately 23 percent of the world’s incarcerated
population).
39. The U.S. incarcerates approximately 2.29 million people as compared to both
China and all of Europe combined, which incarcerate approximately 1.65 million and 1.85
million people respectively. Id. at 4–6. Moreover, in 2012 China had a population of
approximately 1.35 billion, which is over a billion more people than the approximately
313.9 million people in the U.S. the same year. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 37.
40. See The New Public Enemy No. 1, TIME, June. 28, 1971 at 20. See also RUTH
WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA, University 18–19 (2007) (“Drug commitments to federal and
state prisons surged 975 percent between 1982 and 1999, even though according to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, illegal drug use in the U.S. declined drastically starting in the
mid-1970s.”); E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239808,
PRISONERS
IN
2011
6
(Dec.
2012),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf (showing an increase in imprisonment rates
from 470 per 100,000 in 2000 to a high of 506 per 100,000 in 2007 and 2008 and back down
to 492 per 100,000 in 2011); ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 188207, PRISONERS IN 2000 1 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p00.pdf (showing an increase in incarceration rates
of people held in state or federal prisons from 292 per 100,000 in 1990 to 477 per 100,000 in
2000); ROBYN L. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1990 2 (May 1991),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p90.pdf (showing an increase of
incarceration rates from 139 per 100,000 in 1980 to 293 per 100,000 in 1990).
41. See Lynch & Pridemore, supra note 36, at 44 (“The aggressive stance that the
United States has taken toward drug crime is also a major contributor to the prison
population. The United States is more likely to treat drug activity as a crime than most other
nations, more likely to sentence convicted persons to prison, and more likely to require
offenders to serve more time. Other nations may be similar to the United States in one of
these aspects, but none is as punitive in all of these respects.”). See also id. at 40–42; DE LA
VEGA ET AL., supra note 36, at 8 (“[T]he United States is an outlier among countries in its
sentencing practices . . . . The number of prisoners serving LWOP sentences is more than
41,000 in the United States. In contrast there are 59 serving such sentences in Australia, 41
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now over 500 percent more people in jail and prison in the United
States than in 1980. 42
During this same time period, California enacted some of the most
draconian sentencing and parole regimes in the country. 43 California’s
prison population increased by more than eight-fold from
approximately 21,000 in the mid-70s to 171,000 at its peak in 2008, 44
and the number of state prisons increased from twelve to the thirty-four
operating today. 45 As with mass incarceration nationwide, drug
sentencing has been an overwhelming factor in California’s prison
overcrowding crisis. In 1970, approximately five per 100,000
Californians were incarcerated in state prisons on drug convictions; by
the late 1990’s, that number had increased more than ten-fold. 46 Not
in England and 37 in the Netherlands.”).
42. See CARSON & SABOL, supra note 40, at 1 (showing approximately 1.6 million
prisoners under state and federal jurisdiction at year-end 2011); PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN CUSTODY OF STATE OR FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL
AUTHORITIES,
1977–98
(Sept.
1,
2000),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2080 (showing approximately 319,600
prisoners under state and federal jurisdiction at year-end 1980).
43. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b); 1170(a)(1); 1170.12 (West 2013).
44. See infra Figure 2. See also CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., REP., HISTORICAL
TRENDS: INSTITUTION AND PAROLE POPULATION 1976–1996, at 1a (Sept. 1997), available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services_branch/Annual/HI
ST2/HIST2d1996.pdf (reporting a total prison population of 21,088 individuals as of Dec.
31, 1976) [hereinafter HISTORICAL TRENDS: INSTITUTION AND PAROLE POPULATION 19761996]; CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS YEAR AT A GLANCE 12 (Fall 2011),
available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf (showing that the
total adult prison population peaked in 2008 with 171,161 prisoners).
45. See Sharon Dolovich, supra note 4, at 331; CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., MAP
OF CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONAL AND
REHABILITATION
INSTITUTIONS
(Feb.
2014),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/map/docs/Correctional-and-Rehabilitation-Institutions-with-ParoleRegions.pdf (showing that there are 34 state-level adult prisons in California).
46. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS 1970 AND 1971:
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FELON PRISONERS AND PAROLEES 14 (1971), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/
CalPris/CALPRISd1970_71.pdf (data for 1970); CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
CALIFORNIA PRISONERS AND PAROLEES 2000: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON FELON
PRISONERS AND PAROLEES, CIVIL NARCOTIC ADDICT INPATIENTS AND OUTPATIENTS AND
OTHER POPULATIONS, at tbl.9, available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/
CalPrisArchive.html (documenting changes in California’s inmate population over the
years). See also SASHA ABRAMSKY, SACRAMENTO’S K-STREET LOBBYISTS: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INNER CIRCLE 2 (2011), available at
http://pubs.mantisintel.com/Sacramento's_K_Street_Lobbyists.pdf (commissioned by the
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (CJCJ) as part of CJCJ’s Interest Groups and
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surprisingly, all of this came at significant social and financial cost. 47
Unequal treatment in the criminal justice system—especially in
drug law enforcement—has a ripple effect extending beyond
courtrooms and prisons and is one of the primary drivers of racial
inequality in California and the nation. 48 A higher proportion of blacks
are incarcerated in California today than were in Apartheid South
Africa. 49 Latinos are now the fastest-growing and largest group
incarcerated in California state prisons. 50 California over-relies on its
criminal justice system—especially the selective yet excessive use of
incarceration—to address complex economic, mental health, drug
addiction, and other social problems that can never be solved simply by
locking more people behind bars for longer and longer periods of
time. 51
To house this explosion in the numbers of people incarcerated in
the state, California undertook what government analysts called “the
biggest prison building project in the history of the world.” 52 Between
Criminal Justice Policy project).
47. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA BUDGET PROJECT, STEADY CLIMB: STATE CORRECTIONS
SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA, BUDGET BACKGROUNDER 1 (2011), available at
http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2011/11-014_Corrections_Spending_BB.pdf.
48. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6–7 (2010).
49. African Americans are incarcerated at a rate of approximately 2,130 per 100,000 in
California prisons; this figure does not include those incarcerated in county jails or federal
prisons located in California. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS
AND PAROLEES 19 (2009) [hereinafter CDCR Estimates and Statistical Analysis], available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/
CalPris/CALPRISd2009.pdf (48,990 African Americans were incarcerated in CDCR
intuitions at year-end 2009); Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics:
2010 (California), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk
(there were approximately 2,299,072 African Americans in California in 2010); Section IV:
Global Comparisons, Crime and incarceration around the world: U.S. vs. South Africa,
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/us_southafrica.html
(under Apartheid, South African black were incarcerated at a rate of approximately 851 per
100,000).
50. See CDCR Estimates and Statistical Analysis, supra note 49 (“Hispanics” make up
39.3 percent of the CDCR institution population, while whites, blacks and others represent
25.6 percent, 29.0 percent, and 6.1 percent respectively).
51. See GILMORE, supra note 40, at 7, 87–127. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note
48§.
52. See GILMORE, supra note 40, at 5, 27 (2007) (citing CARY J. RUDMAN & JOHN
BERTHELSEN, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’
PLANNING PROCESS: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE COSTS OF INCARCERATING STATE
PRISONERS (1991)) (addressing the questions of “how, why, where and to what effect one of
the planet’s richest and most diverse political economies has organized and executed a
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1984 and 2005, the State built twenty-three new major prison facilities,
costing between $280 million and $350 million each, 53 to
accommodate an immense increase in the size of California’s
incarcerated population, despite steady decreases in the crime rate, 54
and in the face of mounting scientific evidence suggesting that
increasing the rate of incarceration does not substantially reduce
crime. 55 In fact, crime rates for 2010/2011 were approximately the
same as they were in 1960. 56 Yet, the State’s correctional population
increased 217 percent per capita during the same period, from 21,660
(138 per 100,000 people) in 1960 to 162,598 individuals (426 per
100,000 people) in 2010/2011. 57 Building and staffing all these prisons
was enormously expensive. Corrections spending increased from
approximately $1 billion (4.1 percent of the State’s general fund
allocation) in fiscal year 1984–85 to $9.7 billion (10.7 percent of the
State’s general fund allocation) in fiscal year 2008–09.58
In addition to the drug war itself, this massive prison growth was
fueled by some of the most draconian sentencing and parole regimes in
the country. When California adopted the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Law in 1976, the State Legislature explicitly shifted the
focus of incarceration away from rehabilitation and toward

prison-building and-filling plan that government analysts have called ‘the biggest . . . in the
history of the world.’ ” ).
53. Id. at 7. Gilmore notes that the State had previously built only twelve prisons
between 1852 and 1964, and that in addition to the twenty-three major facilities referenced
here, the State had also added thirteen small (500 bed) community corrections facilities, five
prison camps and five mother-prisoner centers. Id.
54. See infra Figure 2 (demonstrating that reported crimes in California have steadily
declined over the past three decades while incarceration rates have steadily increased). See
also GILMORE, supra note 40, at 7 (“The California state prison population grew nearly 500
percent between 1982 and 2000, even though the crime rate peaked in 1980 and declined,
unevenly but decisively, thereafter.”).
55. See Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much Crime Reduction Does the
Marginal Prisoner Buy? 55 J.L. & ECON. 275, 302–10 (2012). The question of whether and
how incarceration rates affect crime is, of course, a complicated one that has been the
subject of much scholarly debate. See, e.g., ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JAMES Q. WILSON, PEW
CTR. ON THE STATES, THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION ON CRIME: TWO NATIONAL
EXPERTS WEIGH IN (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/theimpact-of-incarceration-on-crime-85899374230.
56. In 2010/2011 there were 3,203 reported crimes per 100,000 Californians, as
compared to 1960 when there were 3,474 reported crimes per 100,000 Californians. See
infra Figure 1 and Table 1.
57. Id.
58. See CAL. LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, HISTORICAL DATA (Sept. 2012), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/state-budget/historical-data (reporting annual budgets,
including corrections allocations, from 1984–85 through 2012–13).
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punishment. 59 Reinforced over decades, the State’s system of
determinate sentencing prescribes significant sentence enhancements
for prior convictions, sharply limits judicial discretion to determine
sentence length, requires judges to impose a fixed sentence from three
defined terms (a lower, middle and upper) for felony offenses
depending on the presence of mitigating or aggravating factors, and
makes post-release supervision automatic for virtually everyone who
finishes a prison sentence. 60
California voters have been equally aggressive in increasing
criminal penalties. Between 1972 and 1994, voters enacted numerous
state ballot initiatives ratcheting up sentencing laws, including
Proposition 17 (1972, death penalty); Proposition 7 (1977, murder
penalty); and Proposition 115 (1989 “Crime Victim Justice Reform
Act”). 61 In 1982, voters enacted Proposition 8, the Victims’ Bill of
Rights. 62 In addition to changing the rules of evidence to make
prosecutions and convictions easier, Prop. 8 increased sentences for
persons with prior convictions and limited plea-bargaining and bail for
specified crimes. 63
Most notorious is California’s “Three Strikes” law. 64 Enacted by
voters in 1994, the law mandates a double sentence for anyone
convicted of a felony having previously suffered one prior serious or
violent felony conviction and a sentence of 25-years-to-life for most
persons convicted of a felony having previously suffered two previous

59. The Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, Senate Bill 42 passed 1976 and effective
1977, specified that “the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.” CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2013). See also Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional
Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 210 (2008); VANESSA BARKER,
THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY
AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 201 n.19 (2009) (collecting sources).
60. See Petersilia, supra note 59, at 253–54. Since the enactment of Realignment, those
released from prison whose current convictions were for non-serious, non-violent felonies
and who are not deemed high risk sex offenders are placed in post-release community
supervision, where they are supervised locally by county probation. See infra Section III.A.
Individuals released from prison who do not qualify for PRCS remain in the traditional
state-run parole system.
61. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, INITIATIVES BY TITLE AND SUMMARY YEAR, available
at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/pdf/initiatives-by-title-and-summaryyear.pdf.
62. Id.
63. See BARKER, supra note 59, at 47–84 (describing the shift in California
correctional policy beginning in 1967, with the Reagan-Deukmejian Penalty Package,
Senate Bill 85–87, from a rehabilitative to a retributive model largely justified by a focus
upon victims and mandating and stiffening penal sanctions).
64. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 2004).
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serious or violent convictions. 65 The law also eliminated probation for
many individuals with prior convictions and substantially increased the
sentences for second offenses.66 Although twenty-six other states and
the federal government enacted their own versions of three strikes
laws, California, until recently, 67 remained among the very small
minority imposing life sentences regardless of the severity of the third,
or “triggering,” felony. 68 Despite its proponents’ contentions, in the
seventeen years that followed its enactment, the Three Strikes law had
no demonstrable effect on violent crime levels. 69 It did, however, have
a sizable effect on incarceration rates. Notwithstanding decreasing
crime rates—and California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) data demonstrating that longer prison terms
fail to reduce recidivism or crime rates 70—there were approximately

65. Id. §§ 667, 1170.12. On March 7, 1994, the California Legislature amended
California Penal Code § 667, to include the language known colloquially as the “Three
Strikes Law.” Eight months later, as a sign of the general populace’s support, the California
voters codified nearly identical language at California Penal Code § 1170.12 through
Proposition 184. Further discrepancies between the two statutes have been resolved by the
Courts, such as § 1170.12’s failure to include all qualifying prior out-of-state felonies. See
People v. Hazelton, 926 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1996).
66. Id.
67. See Prop. 36, The Three Strikes Law, Repeat Felony Offenders, Penalties, Initiative
Statute, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (2012), available at
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/36/title-summary.htm [hereinafter Prop. 36].
68. See JOHN CLARK, JAMES AUSTIN & D. ALAN HENRY, “THREE STRIKES AND
YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE) at 7–9 (Sept. 1997), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165369.pdf. See
also Petersilia, supra note 59, at 210.
69. MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STRIKING OUT:
CALIFORNIA’S “THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT” LAW HAS NOT REDUCED VIOLENT
CRIME: A 2011 UPDATE 2 (2011), available at
http://www.cjcj.org/files/Striking_Out_Californias_Three_Strikes_And_Youre_Out_Law_
Has_Not_Reduced_Violent_Crime.pdf.
70. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s data show that
people serving one, two, or three years have nearly the same recidivism rates. See
HISTORICAL TRENDS: INSTITUTION AND PAROLE POPULATION 1976–1996, supra note 44, at
12. Meanwhile, New York and New Jersey have significantly reduced their prison
populations and continued to lower their crime rates. See JAMES AUSTIN & MICHAEL
JACOBSON, HOW NEW YORK CITY REDUCED MASS INCARCERATION: A MODEL FOR
CHANGE? 6 (Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/How_NYC_Reduced_Mass_In
carceration.pdf (“New York is one of the first states to significantly reduce its entire
correctional population. . . . This reduction occurred as the crime rate sharply declined in
New York, showing that increasing imprisonment or other forms of correction are not
needed to enjoy a lower crime rate.”); Brief for Center on the Administration of Criminal
Law and 30 Criminologists as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Schwarzenegger v.
Plata, 130 S. Ct. 3413 (2010) (No. 09-1233) (“New Jersey likewise experienced declining
crime rates contemporaneously with declining prison populations: the crime rate there fell
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33,000 second strikers and 9,000 third strikers in prison by 2012, at
significant taxpayer expense. 71
Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate crime and
incarceration trends over time in California. 72 First, Table 1 compares
17% from 2000 to 2008, while the number of offenders sentenced to prison declined by
7%.”); Craig Haney, Prison Effects of in the Age of Mass Incarceration, THE PRISON J. 15
(Jan. 25, 2012), available at
http://tpj.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/09/11/0032885512448604 (finding that
imprisonment has a “criminogenic”—crime producing—effect; moreover, the more time
served the more likely one is to offend again).
71. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to
October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18. Analysts have
documented wide disparities in Three Strikes charging decisions from county to county. A
2005 report from the non-partisan California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) found that
Kern County was over 13 times more likely to send an arrestee to state prison with a strike
enhancement than San Francisco County. See A Primer: Three Strikes—The Impact After
More Than a Decade, CAL. LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE (Oct. 2005),
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm [hereinafter A Primer: Three
Strikes] (“Based on discussions with representatives of the courts and district attorneys’
offices, we conclude that local county justice systems have developed various strategies for
handling their Three Strikes caseloads, based on different policy priorities and fiscal
constraints. Thus, the manner in which the law is implemented at the local level by
prosecutors and judges varies across counties. In some counties, for example, prosecutors
seek Three Strikes enhancements only in certain cases, such as for certain types of crimes
that are particular problems in their county or where the current offense is serious or violent.
In other counties, prosecutors seek Three Strikes enhancements in most eligible cases.
Similarly, judges vary in how often they dismiss prior strikes, based on discretion afforded
to them under the Romero decision. In addition, variation in the application of Three Strikes
not only exists across counties, but can also occur within counties. In particular, prosecution
practices change over time as counties experience turnover of district attorneys and judges
and as they develop new methods for handling Three Strikes cases.”). See also Ina Jaffe,
Cases Show Disparity Of California’s 3 Strikes Law, NPR (Oct. 30, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114301025;
MEGAN
BERWICK,
RACHEL LINDENBERG, & JULIA VAN ROO, WOBBLERS & CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CALIFORNIA A STUDY INTO PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 1 (Mar. 20, 2010), available at
http://ips.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/shared/DA%20Discretion%20Final%20Report.pdf
(“This study confirms that there is wide variation among California counties in the
percentages of wobblers charged as misdemeanors.”).
72. Data are based on crimes that are reported to sheriffs’ and police departments.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. Crime rates in recent years may be inflated as a
result of increased smartphone and tablet theft. See, e.g., Don Thompson, California bill to
deter smartphone thefts advances; mandates built-in shut-off technology, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD
REPORT,
May
8,
2014,
available
at
http://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2014/05/08/california-smartphone-killswitch-bill-advances (describing smartphone and tablet theft as a “crime wave sweeping”
California); Rolfe Winkler, Fighting the iCrime Wave, Device theft has exploded. New
solutions are on the way. Is the industry doing enough about ‘Apple picking’?, WALL
STREET
J,
Jul.
27,
2014,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443931404577550823904439852
(“Police across the nation are fighting surges in mobile phone and tablet thefts.”).
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the overall state population, crime rates, and the per capita prison
population in 1960 with 2010 figures. Next, Figure 1 provides a
breakdown of California crime rates from 1960 to 2010. Finally, Figure
2 demonstrates the state’s crime rates and prison population from 1980
to 2010. As shown, over time California continued to incarcerate
increasing numbers of people in prison despite decreasing crime rates.
Table 1. 1960 and 2010 Comparisons
California Population
Crime Rate (crimes per
100,000)
Prison Population
Rate Per 100,000
Parole Population
Rate Per 100,000

1960
15,717,204
3,474

2010/11
37,253,956
3,203

%
Change
137%
-8%

21,660
138
8,511
54

162,598
436
103,828
279

651%
217%
1,120%
415%

What the California Prison Population Would Be Based on 1960 Crime
and Incarceration rates Applied to 2010 California Population
51,340 prisoners
What the California Parole Population Would Be Based on 1960 Crime
and Incarceration rates Applied to 2010 California Population
20,173 parolees
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BREAKING POINT: THE FEDERAL COURTS STEP IN

By 2006, California’s prisons were operating at nearly double
their capacity. 73 In 2007, the Little Hoover Commission 74 found that:
California’s correctional system is in a tailspin that threatens public
safety and raises the risk of fiscal disaster. The failing correctional
system is the largest and most immediate crisis facing policymakers. For decades, governors and lawmakers fearful of appearing
soft on crime have failed to muster the political will to address the
looming crisis. And now their time has run out. 75

73. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.Supp.2d at 888 (E. D. Cal. 2009).
74. The Little Hoover Commission is a statutorily-created state agency tasked with
“promoting economy, efficiency, and improved service in the transaction of the public
business in the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive branch
of the state government, and in making the operation of all state departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities, and all expenditures of public funds, more directly responsive to the
wishes of the people as expressed by their elected representatives.” Cal. Gov't. Code §§
8501, 8521.
75. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA'S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS
RUNNING OUT (Jan. 25, 2007) at i, [hereinafter LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N] available at
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At the time the Little Hoover Commission sounded that alarm, the
federal courts were about to intercede in a dramatic fashion. Two classaction lawsuits on behalf of California prisoners, Coleman v. Wilson
and Plata v. Davis, had been slowly wending their way through the
courts; Coleman was originally filed in 1990 and Plata in 2001. 76 In
2007 the cases were consolidated before a three-judge district court,
which was convened to consider a population reduction order pursuant
to the PLRA. 77 On August 4, 2009, the three-judge court found that
overcrowding in California’s prisons created conditions that violated
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment:
The state's prisons have become places of extreme peril to the
safety of persons they house, while contributing little to the safety
of California's residents. California spends more on corrections
than most countries in the world, but the state reaps fewer public
safety benefits. Although California's existing prison system serves
neither the public nor the inmates well, the state has for years been
unable or unwilling to implement the reforms necessary to reverse
its continuing deterioration. . . . The massive 750% increase in the
California prison population since the mid–1970s is the result of
political decisions made over three decades, including the shift to
inflexible determinate sentencing and the passage of harsh
mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws, as well as the state's
counterproductive parole system. . . . The convergence of tough-oncrime policies and an unwillingness to expend the necessary funds
to support the population growth has brought California's prisons to
the breaking point. . . . California's prisons remain severely
overcrowded, and inmates in the California prison system continue
to languish without constitutionally adequate medical and mental
health care. . . . Where the political process has utterly failed to
protect the constitutional rights of a minority, the courts can, and
must, vindicate those rights. 78

The three-judge court ordered the State to submit a plan that would
reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/Report185.pdf.
76. Originally filed as Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E. D. Cal. 1995); Plata
v. Davis, 329 F. 3d 1101 (2003).
77. See supra note 1; See also Motion to Convene the Three-Judge Panel, Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 01-1351) (filed Nov. 13, 2006);
Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Convene Three-Judge Court, Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 01-1351) (filed July 23, 2007).
78. Coleman, 922 F.Supp.2d at 887-888 (internal quotations and citations omitted,
emphasis in original).
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two years. 79
A. The State’s Response: Increase Capacity by Building More
Prisons
The State’s initial political and legal response to the population
reduction order was to enact AB 900, a massive $7 billion prison and
jail construction bond. 80 AB 900 was described by the New York
Times as, “the largest single prison construction program in the
nation’s history.” 81 AB 900 also included “prison reform” measures
requiring: additional rehabilitation and treatment services for prisoners
and parolees; expanded substance abuse treatment services in prisons;
prisoner assessments to aid in reentry and reduce recidivism; and
increased day treatment and crisis care services for parolees with
mental health problems. 82
After the passage of AB 900 the Plata Receiver, appointed by the
federal court to oversee healthcare at CDCR facilities, modified the
prison construction plan to include the creation of 10,000 specialized
medical and mental health beds.83 But the State, under the leadership of
then-Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr., reneged on this plan and
changed its position in the middle of the 2008 Coleman/Plata trial,
abandoning the 10,000 specialized bed plan. 84 The broader prison
79. Id. at 1003-4.
80. See A.B. 900, 2007-2008 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (signed by Governor
Schwarzenegger May 3, 2007); see also See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Convene
Three-Judge Court, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 at 8 (E.D. Cal. 2006)
(No. 01-1351) (“The Court acknowledges that the State has recently attempted to take action
to reduce prison crowding through Assembly Bill 900 . . . Even assuming that the provisions
of this legislation were to be timely implemented, however–which the Court has doubts
about given the history of delays in this case, the highly controversial and political nature of
the subject matter, and the conflicts that may sometimes arise between meeting
constitutional standards and the tough-on-crime approach to law enforcement espoused by
some members of the California Legislature–it is unclear whether the legislation would
reduce the impacts of overcrowding in any meaningful way.”); see also Andy Furillo,
Prison Expansion Plan Shrinks, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 18, 2008 (“The Schwarzenegger
administration offered the AB 900 construction plan as its main line of defense against a
legal motion filed by inmates rights lawyers to cap the state’s prison population.”).
81. Jennifer Steinhauer, California to Address Prison Overcrowding With Giant
Building
Program,
NY
TIMES,
Apr.
27,
2007,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/us/27prisons.html?_r=0.
82. See A.B. 900, 2007-2008 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
83. See Order at 4, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2008)
(No. 01-1351) (filed Feb. 26, 2008) (“The Receiver in Plata has begun to implement three
separate but related construction projects: . . . The construction of approximately 5,000
additional CDCR medical beds and approximately 5,000 CDCR mental health beds.”).
84. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1938. (“At the time of the [three-judge] court’s decision
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expansion plan was also halted, largely a result of the state’s budget
crisis. 85 In addition, Brown was running for Governor on a platform
that attacked the Receiver and the specialized building plan as wasteful
and too fancy for prisoners. 86 By failing to build new prison beds—as a
result of fiscal and political delays—the State severely undermined its
primary defense to the population reduction order. 87
the State had plans to build new medical and housing facilities, but funding for some plans
had not been secured and funding for other plans had been delayed by the legislature for
years. Particularly in light of California’s ongoing fiscal crisis, the three-judge court deemed
‘chimerical’ any ‘remedy that requires significant additional spending by the state.’ Events
subsequent to the three-judge court's decision have confirmed this conclusion. In October
2010, the State notified the Coleman District Court that a substantial component of its
construction plans had been delayed indefinitely by the legislature.”) (citing v.
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 954 (E.D. Cal. 2009)) (internal citations omitted);
Transcripts of Proceedings, Tuesday, November, 18, 2008 at 2403, Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 01-1351) (former
Assemblyman and Riverside County District Attorney Rodric Pacheco testified that the
Plata Receiver never received the money necessary to implement his construction plan); id.
at 2462 (former Assemblyman Todd Spitzer testified, “[T]hat AB 900 could not be
implemented because the Attorney General [Edmund G. Brown Jr.] had not issued a clean
bond opinion on AB 900” and did not try to persuade the Legislature to move forward); id.
at 2464 (former Assemblyman Spitzer also testified that the Legislature failed to pass the
clean-up legislation that was necessary to fund AB 900 because the Receiver’s request for
medical beds was part of the package); see also Andy Furillo, Prison Expansion Plan
Shrinks, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 18, 2008.
85. See MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL OUTLOOK:
LAO PROJECTIONS 2007-08 THROUGH 2012-13 (Nov. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2007/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_07.aspx (since the time the 2007–
08 Budget Act was enacted in August 2007, “the 2007–08 budget situation has deteriorated
by almost $6 billion. Under our forecast, absent corrective action, the state would end the
current fiscal year with a $1.9 billion deficit. . . . In addition to a negative carry–in balance
from 2007–08, we project the state will face an $8 billion operating shortfall in 2008–09.”).
86. See, e.g., Jerry Brown, Jerry Brown: Prison Czar's Plan Unrealistic, Intrusive,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Feb.
4,
2009),
available
at
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/speeches/release.php?id=1695 (“We don’t disagree that the state
has to provide care that meets constitutional standards and is not cruel and unusual. But
constitutional care doesn’t mean yoga rooms and music therapy.”).
87. Coleman, 922 F.Supp. 2d at 952 (“In the first place, AB 900 construction has
already been delayed for more than two years due to the absence of funding. . .. As far as we
are aware, it remains the case today, eight months later, that there is no funding for AB 900
and no ground has been broken on the AB 900–authorized re-entry facilities. Second, even if
funding were secured in the near future, other practical concerns would lead to significant
additional delays.”); id. 954 (“Because the fiscal crisis has required ‘severe and significant
cuts to vital State programs,’ the state refused to enter into any agreement that would
‘require[ ] the State to seek I–Bank funding, or any other additional funding not previously
appropriated by the California Legislature.’ Although defendants did state that they would
use a ‘significant’ but unspecified portion of the funds allocated by the legislature in AB 900
‘to build appropriate beds for inmates with disabilities and/or other health needs,’ there is no
indication as to when such funds will be made available; when construction might begin; or
what part, if any, of the constitutional inadequacies in delivering medical and mental health
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Even if the State had been able to increase bed capacity to the
levels originally intended under AB 900, that action alone would
almost certainly have been insufficient to remedy to the constitutional
violations in CDCR facilities. As recounted in the August 2009 threejudge court order, and again later in the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court
opinion, overcrowding means that there is a shortage of resources
necessary to address the fundamental needs of the incarcerated
population. 88 Said another way, prisons require more than just beds,
they also require hospitals and staff—including specialized medical
and mental health staff—to meet the medical and mental health needs

care to California inmates might be remedied by such construction.”) (internal citations
omitted); id. at 951 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[W]hat we must determine is not whether building
prisons could solve the problem, but whether prison construction offers an actual, feasible,
sufficiently timely remedy for the unconstitutional state of medical and mental health care in
California's prisons. Here, California has no plans to construct additional prisons in the near
future and has not suggested that it does. As a result, we need not consider further the
construction of additional prisons as an alternative remedy.”); id. at 953 (“ [W]e conclude
that neither the Receiver's medical facility construction plans nor the proposed AB 900 infill beds—prison expansion—can remedy the constitutional violations at issue in Plata and
Coleman. Like the AB 900 re-entry facilities, these proposed facilities will not be realized at
any point in the near future. Furthermore, their funding is threatened by the present fiscal
crisis, and the proposed construction would in any event likely fall far short of remedying
the problems created by the crowding of California's prisons.”).
88. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939 (“[A]bsent a reduction in overcrowding, any remedy
might prove unattainable and would at the very least require vast expenditures of resources
by the State. Nothing in the long history of the Coleman and Plata actions demonstrates any
real possibility that the necessary resources would be made available.”); id. at 1938
(“Construction of new facilities, in theory, could alleviate overcrowding, but the three-judge
court found no realistic possibility that California would be able to build itself out of this
crisis. . . . even if planned construction were to be completed, the Plata Receiver found that
many so-called ‘expansion’ plans called for cramming more prisoners into existing prisons
without expanding administrative and support facilities. The former acting secretary of the
California prisons explained that these plans would ‘compound the burdens imposed on
prison administrators and line staff’ by adding to the already overwhelming prison
population, creating new barriers to achievement of a remedy.”) (emphasis added) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55 (“On a more
fundamental level, the AB 900 in-fill construction plan ‘essentially is a prison expansion
measure which increases the number of prison cells without addressing the fundamental
structural issues that have caused the crisis and that have created unconstitutional conditions
within the prisons.’ ‘[t]he so-called “in-fill” beds will cause more problems than they will
solve. Many of California's prisons are so big that they are effectively unmanageable.
Wardens and other administrators spend much of their time responding to crises, rather than
fulfilling their responsibilities to provide adequate medical and mental health care. Unless
these in-fill beds stand alone with their own administrative and support facilities, adding
thousands of additional prisoners to already overburdened facilities will only compound the
burdens imposed on prison administrators and line staff.’. . . Thus, while the construction of
in-fill beds would reduce the use of ‘bad beds,’ the principal effects of the overcrowding in
California's prisons would remain unaddressed.”) (internal citations omitted).
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of the prisoners they house. 89
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Brown v. Plata 90
On May 23, 2011, in Brown v. Plata, 91 the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed that overcrowding in California’s prisons created conditions that
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 92 The Court upheld the three–judge court’s order requiring
the CDCR to decrease overcrowding to no more than 137.5 percent of
design capacity, 93 amounting to a reduction of approximately 33,000
prisoners, 94 by December 31, 2013. 95 These numbers did not account

89. Coleman, 922 F.Supp. 2d at 962 (“The evidence establishes that ‘[r]educing the
population in the system to a manageable level is the only way to create an environment in
which other reform efforts, including strengthening medical management, hiring additional
medical and custody staffing, and improving medical records and tracking systems, can take
root in the foreseeable future.’ Other forms of relief are either unrealistic or depend upon a
reduction in prison overcrowding for their success. Accordingly, we find, by clear and
convincing evidence, that no relief other than a prisoner release order is capable of
remedying the constitutional deficiencies at the heart of these two cases.”) (internal citations
omitted); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1938 ( “[A]bsent a population reduction, continued efforts by
the Receiver and Special Master would not achieve a remedy.”); id. at 1939 (“Without a
reduction in overcrowding, there will be no efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional care
of the sick and mentally ill in California's prisons.”).
90. For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision and the
litigation leading up to it, see Ken Strutin, The Realignment of Incarcerative Punishment:
Sentencing Reform and the Conditions of Confinement, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1313,
1324–38 (2012) (because prison overcrowding resulted in Constitutionally inadequate
medical and mental health conditions, the Court ordered the CDCR to reduce overcrowding
as a mechanism for remedying the medical and mental health violations). See also, JOAN
PETERSILIA, SARA ABARBANEL, JOHN S. BUTLER, MARK FELDMAN, MARIAM HINDS,
KEVIN E. JASON, CORINNE KEEL, MATT J. OWENS, AND CAMDEN VILKIN, VOICES FROM
THE FIELD: HOW CALIFORNIA STAKEHOLDERS VIEW PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT (Jan.
1,
2014),
at
12–16,
[hereinafter VOICES
FROM
THE
FIELD], available
at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Petersilia%20VOICES%20no%20es%20Final%20022814.pdf.
91. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923, 1947 (2011).
92. Id.
93. Design capacity is not a static concept; as the CDCR constructs new housing, the
institutions’ design capacity increases. For example, as of December 5 2012, CDCR
institutions were designed to hold 79,756 people; however, they were actually holding
119,741 or 150.1 percent of design capacity. See Status Report at Exhibit A, Plata v. Brown,
922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 4271-1).
94. See State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order supra, note 6 (stating that at the
time of the Supreme Court’s decision there were approximately 143,000 prisoners in the
CDCR’s 33 facilities, which were designed to hold 79,8588 individuals); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at
1943–47 (holding that the CDCR must reduce its prisoner population to 137.5 percent of
design capacity).
95. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923, 1947; Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’
Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order at 2, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp.

HOPPER FINAL

550

8/21/2014 4:04 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 54

for the 8,883 prisoners then housed in four out-of-state private prisons
on an emergency basis. 96
III.

THE STATE’S INITIAL RESPONSE TO BROWN V. PLATA:
PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT

By 2011, when the Supreme Court decided Plata, the state’s
finances were in far worse condition than when it had enacted AB 900
two years earlier. Given new fiscal constraints, including a twenty
billion dollar annual budget deficit, 97 the State could not satisfy the
Supreme Court’s order by simply building more prisons to increase
overall capacity. 98 Instead, the “cornerstone” of the State’s plan to
2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 4271-1) (although the State originally had two years from
time of the Supreme Court judgment to meet its goal, the three-judge court extended the date
for compliance to December 31, 2013). See also See Declaration of James Austin in Support
of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population
Reduction, supra note 18, at 2 (showing that there were 8,883 CDCR prisoners house outof-state in December 2012).
96. The housing of prisoners in out-of-state prisons was permitted by a “state of
emergency proclamation” issued by Governor Schwarzenegger in 2006 due to the level of
crowding in the CDCR prisons. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’
Statement in Response to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra
note 18, at 2; Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, CAL. OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR (Oct. 4, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278. The proclamation allowed
California inmates to be housed in out-of-state prisons. Id. However, the proclamation was
terminated by the Governor in January 2013; thus, doing away with the State’s legal
authority to keep prisoners in out-of-state facilities. See Proclamation Terminating the
Prison Overcrowding Proclamation, CAL. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR (Jan. 8, 2013), available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-docs-01-07-13/Terminating-PrisonOvercrowding-Emergency-Proclamation-10-4-06.pdf. The Governor renewed the State’s
legal authority to keep California prisoners in out-of-state facilities by signing SB 105 into
law in September 2013. S.B. 105, supra note 11 (discussed infra in Section IV.A.). In
addition, in its February 2014 Order, the three-judge court granted the State authority to
maintain current levels of prisoners housed in out-of-state facilities. See Order Granting in
Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013
Deadline, supra note 20, at 2. The State was thus granted authority to send California
prisoners out-of-state only to replace prisoners released from custody or returning to
California, not to increase the total number of inmates house in out-of-state facilities. Id.
97. See THE 2011-12 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL OUTLOOK supra note 9.
98. It is worth noting that as of 2013, with Proposition 30’s passage and increased
revenues, along with many cycles of social service cuts, Governor Brown now says budget
deficit is erased. See CAL. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, 2013–14 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET
SUMMARY 1 (Jan. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.dof.ca.gov/documents/FullBudgetSummary_web2013.pdf [hereinafter
GOVERNOR’S BUDGET]; Governor Brown Delivers 2013 State of the State Address, CAL.
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR (Jan. 24, 2013), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17906; CAL. LEG.
ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET: OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 3, 5
(Jan. 2013), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/Publications/Detail/2681. As a practical and
political matter, however, the State is unlikely to embark upon a new prison construction

HOPPER FINAL

2014]

8/21/2014 4:04 PM

CA CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT

551

comply with the Supreme Court’s Plata mandate was Realignment. 99
A. The Nuts and Bolts of Realignment 100
Realignment made three key changes to California’s criminal justice
administration:
1) Most individuals newly convicted of low-level, non-serious
felonies stay at the county level. Most individuals sentenced for a
non-serious, non-violent, non-sex-registerable felony offense (a
“non-non-non”), and who have no such prior convictions, now
remain under the jurisdiction of the county—in jail or under some
other form of local supervision—rather than being sent to state
prison. 101
2) Counties assume greater post-release supervision responsibilities.
Starting October 1, 2011, those released from prison whose current
convictions were for non-serious, non-violent felonies and who are
not deemed high risk sex offenders 102 are placed on a new form of
local monitoring called “post-release community supervision”
(“PRCS”) under the supervision of county probation. 103 Technical
violations by any individual on supervision, whether by a county or
state agency, will be served in county jail and only new felony

boom, as evidenced by the Governor’s proposed 2013 budget which provides only a
minimal increase in funding for the CDCR. See id.
99. See State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order, supra note 6 (CDCR Secretary
Matthew Cate stating “AB 109 is the cornerstone of the solution [to address overcrowding],
and the Legislature must act to protect public safety by funding Realignment.”). See also
Governor Brown Pledges State Support as Local Leaders Launch Realignment, available at
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17245 (Quoting Governor Brown, “The U.S. Supreme Court
has ordered California to reduce its prison population without delay and realignment is the
most viable plan to comply with the Court’s order.”).
100. For a detailed description of the Realignment legislation, see JOAN PETERSILIA, ET
AL., VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 90, at 23–25.
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.
102. CDCR Parole completes a risk assessment for all persons who are required to
register as sex offenders, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 290, in order to determine whether
they are to be identified as “high risk sex offenders.” See Implementation of the Post Release
Community Supervision Act of 2011, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. (Aug. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/PRCS-County.pdf.
103. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3450–65. See id. § 3451 (providing that inmates released
from state prison after October 1, 2011 for a non-violent, non-serious, nonsexual offense be
supervised by the county for a period of not more than three years). Whether an individual is
subject to Post Release Community Supervision is controlled by the individual’s most recent
offense; prior serious, violent, or sex-related felony convictions other than the latest offense
are not taken into account for purposes of assigning offenders to PRCS.
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offenses will return an individual to state prison. 104 Counties have
broad discretion to sanction PRCS violators in jails or through noncustodial alternatives, such as electronic monitoring or substanceabuse treatment. 105
Realignment was prospective only from its October 1, 2011
effective date and did not provide for the transfer or early release
of any inmates already serving sentences in state prison. In
addition, anyone on parole before October 1, 2011 remains under
state jurisdiction until discharged by the CDCR. 106
3) The Legislature explicitly encouraged counties to use evidencebased alternatives to incarceration. As we discuss further in Section
V, infra, Realignment did not change the length of sentences that
can be imposed for the “realigned” offenses, the applicability of
sentencing enhancements, or the fact that these offenses remain
felonies. But the legislation did encourage counties to develop
community-based alternatives to incarceration for these low-level
crimes, rather than simply incarcerating the realigned population in
local jails for the same period of time they would have previously
served in state prison. 107 The legislation also granted county
sheriffs additional discretion to manage their jail populations
through use of intermediate alternative sanctions other than
incarceration or traditional probation supervision. 108

104. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3458 (“No person subject to this title shall be returned to
prison for a violation of any condition of the person's postrelease supervision agreement.”);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3452(b)(3) (“An advisement that if a person breaks the law or violates
the conditions of release, he or she can be incarcerated in a county jail regardless of whether
or not new charges are filed.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3455(a)(1)-(2), (d) (limiting penalties
for each PRCS violation to no more than 180 days in county jail.).
105. Id. § 3455
106. See id. § 3000.09.
107. See id. § 17.5(a).
108. See id. § 17.5(a)(3); id. § 1230.1(d) (explicitly providing that, “[c]onsistent with
local needs and resources, the [Realignment implementation] plan may include
recommendations to maximize the effective investment of criminal justice resources in
evidence-based correctional sanctions and programs, including, but not limited to, day
reporting centers, drug courts, residential multiservice centers, mental health treatment
programs, electronic and GPS monitoring programs, victim restitution programs, counseling
programs, community service programs, educational programs, and work training
programs.”); id. § 1203.018 (authorizing counties to offer electronic monitoring for inmates
being held in lieu of bail in county jail); id. § 3450 (authorizing a range of incarceration
alternatives).
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The legislative intent of Realignment implicitly acknowledged that
counties are able to integrate public health and social services as
part of rehabilitation and reentry in ways that the state cannot. 109
The legislation created a “split sentencing” option, which allows a
judge to split the sentence for an eligible non-non-non defendant
between jail time and a period of time in the community under the
supervision of the county probation department. 110 This concluding
period served under probation is known as mandatory
supervision. 111 This practice safely reduces the jail population and
gives counties an opportunity to supervise convicted individuals
after their release. 112 Realigned individuals serving their entire
sentences in jail receive no post-release supervision at all. 113
B. Realignment’s Potential: A Paradigm Shift in How
Government Addresses Low-level, Non-Violent Crime
If Realignment did nothing more than move tens of thousands of
prisoners from state-run prisons to county-run jails, few would suggest
it represented a paradigm shift in criminal justice policy. The Governor
and the Legislature made clear, however, that they intended
Realignment to do far more than simply shift the location of
incarceration for the specified low-level offenses. 114 The legislation
explicitly encourages counties to develop and implement programs

109. See, e.g., Marissa Lagos, Gov. Jerry Brown Promises Constitutional Amendment to
Fund
Realignment,
SF
GATE
(Sept.
21,
2011),
http://blog.sfgate.com/nov05election/2011/09/21/gov-jerry-brown-promisesconstitutionalamendment-to-fund-realignment/ (“The governor and other supporters believe that city
police and county sheriffs, probation departments and social service programs will do a
better job helping low-level offenders stay out of trouble.”). See also What They’re
Saying…, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/whattheyre-saying.html (compiling comments from local government officials from around the
state concurring that local governments can do a better job than the State, including San
Mateo County Sheriff Greg Munks who explained “[k]eeping individuals closer to the
community, keeping them closer to their families, and connecting them with communitybased resources that they’re going to need to be successful when they get out, because they
are going to get out.”).
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(B).
111. See Mandatory Supervision: The Benefits of Evidence Based Supervision under
Public Safety Realignment, CHIEF PROBATION OFFICERS OF CAL. ISSUE BRIEF (Winter
2012), available at http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/issuebrief2.pdf [hereinafter
Mandatory Supervision]; California Realignment Dashboard, supra note 14.
112. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(A) (also allowing judges to sentence
individuals convicted of low-level felonies to serve their full terms in jail, with absolutely no
post-release supervision).
113. Id.
114. See id. § 17.5(a).
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drawing on cooperation among public health and social service
agencies and non-governmental community organizations.115 In stark
contrast to the preceding decades of tough-on-crime politics and
California’s existing harsh sentencing laws discussed above in Section
I, the articulated legislative intent declared a new focus on
rehabilitating rather than just punishing those convicted only of nonserious, non-violent offenses. 116
The formal legislative findings and declarations state that,
“[c]riminal justice policies that rely on building and operating more
prisons to address community safety concerns are not sustainable, and
will not result in improved public safety.” 117 The legislation urges
counties to employ “evidence-based strategies” and “community-based
punishment” 118 for low-level, non-violent offenses rather than relying
primarily on incarceration in state prisons or county jails. 119 And the

115. Id. § 1170(h)(5)(A).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. §§ 17.5(a), 1170(h), 1230.1(d) (explicitly providing that, “[c]onsistent with
local needs and resources, the [Realignment implementation] plan may include
recommendations to maximize the effective investment of criminal justice resources in
evidence-based correctional sanctions and programs, including, but not limited to, day
reporting centers, drug courts, residential multiservice centers, mental health treatment
programs, electronic and GPS monitoring programs, victim restitution programs, counseling
programs, community service programs, educational programs, and work training
programs.”); id. § 1203.018 (authorizing counties to offer electronic monitoring for inmates
being held in lieu of bail in county jail); id. § 3450 (authorizing a range of incarceration
alternatives). Section 17.5 defines “community-based punishment” as “correctional
sanctions and programming encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial responses
to criminal or noncompliant offender activity.” Examples of community-based punishment
include: intensive community supervision; home detention with non-GPS electronic
monitoring (such as telephone check-ins) or GPS monitoring; mandatory community
service; restorative justice programs such as mandatory victim restitution and victimoffender reconciliation; work, training, or education in a furlough program, or work, in lieu
of confinement, in a work release program; day reporting; residential or nonresidential
substance abuse treatment programs; mother-infant care programs; and community-based
residential programs offering structure, supervision, drug treatment, alcohol treatment,
literacy programming, employment counseling, psychological counseling, mental health
treatment, or any combination of these and other interventions.
119. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM APRIL
2011: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 26 (Apr. 2011), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_correcti
ons/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons percent20.pdf (table comparing
state recidivism rates); CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (“California must reinvest its criminal
justice resources to support community-based corrections programs and evidence-based
practices . . . . Realigning low-level felony offenders who do not have prior convictions for
serious, violent, or sex offenses to locally run community-based corrections programs,
which are strengthened through community-based punishment, evidence-based practices,
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Legislature further acknowledged that, “[d]espite the dramatic increase
in [state] corrections spending over the past two decades, reincarceration rates . . . remain unchanged or have worsened . . . .” 120
Indeed, California’s state prison recidivism rate—61 percent as of
January 2014 121—is among the highest in the nation. 122 Prior to
Realignment’s enactment, more than 10,000 people completed their
sentences and were released from state prison each month in
California. 123 However, another approximately 10,000 people each
month replaced them. 124 California’s prisons had all but turned the
metaphorical “revolving door” into a literal one.
The stated intent of Realignment is to interrupt this cycle by
preventing crime, limiting future victims, and more effectively
allocating resources.125 The legislation urges counties to “manage and
allocate criminal justice populations more cost-effectively, generating
savings that can be reinvested in evidence-based strategies that increase
public safety while holding offenders accountable.” 126 It encourages
counties to use “evidence-based strategies” that are demonstrated to
reduce recidivism rates, often dramatically, 127 and “community-based
punishment” to reduce crime. 128 It is primarily focused on reducing reimproved supervision strategies, and enhanced secured capacity, will improve public safety
outcomes among adult felons and facilitate their reintegration back into society. Community
based corrections programs require a partnership between local public safety entities and the
county to provide and expand the use of community-based punishment for low-level
offender populations. Each county’s Local Community Corrections Partnership . . . should
play a critical role in developing programs and ensuring appropriate outcomes for low-level
offenders.”).
120. Id.
121. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2013 OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT 11–12
(Jan.
2014),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/Outcome_Evaluatio
n_Report_2013.pdf.
122. Id.; see also THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 119, at 10–11.
123. In 2010, the last full year before realignment was implemented, 62,003 inmates
were released on their first parole, 58,716 were released on re-parole, and 2,537 were
discharged from CDCR facilities. Thus, on average, over 10,000 inmates were released from
a California state prison each month. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., MOVEMENT OF
PRISON POPULATION CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 3 (Jan. 2011),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/
Move5/Move5d2010.pdf.
124. Id.
125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a).
126. Id.
127. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 119, at 26.
128. Section 17.5 defines “community-based punishment” as “correctional sanctions and
programming encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial responses to criminal or
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offending by individuals already involved in the criminal justice
system—those who have been or who are at risk of walking through
that revolving door. Realignment aims to “improve public safety
outcomes among adult felons and facilitate their reintegration back into
society.” 129
C. Realignment’s Limitations
Remarkable and ambitious as Realignment’s potential may be, the
results thus far have been decidedly mixed. As we discuss below in
Section V, after nearly three years and a constitutional amendment to
increase funding for its implementation, it is now clear that
Realignment, in its current form, will never be enough to reduce the
state prison population sufficiently to comply with the Plata
mandate. 130 In this Section we examine, and propose solutions to, four
related and significant problems that have limited Realignment’s
effectiveness in reducing the prison population and its potential to
usher in a new criminal justice paradigm.
1. Realignment Left Individual Counties Too Much Discretion to
Incarcerate
Realignment left individual counties too much discretion to
incarcerate persons convicted of “realigned” offenses in local jails,
rather than utilize alternatives to incarceration. The prison
overcrowding problem cannot be separated from the problem of
overcrowded county jails. Given that the State’s primary response to
the Plata order is to divert tens or hundreds of thousands of people–
who would previously have been sent to state prison–to county
correctional systems, Realignment cannot succeed unless there is room
noncompliant offender activity.” Examples of community-based punishment include:
intensive community supervision; home detention with non-GPS electronic monitoring
(such as telephone check-ins) or GPS monitoring; mandatory community service; restorative
justice programs such as mandatory victim restitution and victim-offender reconciliation;
work, training, or education in a furlough program, or work, in lieu of confinement, in a
work release program; day reporting; residential or nonresidential substance abuse treatment
programs; mother-infant care programs; and community-based residential programs offering
structure, supervision, drug treatment, alcohol treatment, literacy programming, employment
counseling, psychological counseling, mental health treatment, or any combination of these
and other interventions.
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a).
130. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra
note 5 at 2. See Declaration of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order at 7, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004
(E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351).
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at the county-level to absorb these prisoners. County jails throughout
the state, however, were themselves overcrowded when Realignment
was enacted. 131 Since then, overcrowding has persisted or gotten worse
in many counties. 132 In addition, many of the same counties that
historically sent disproportionately more people to state prison for lowlevel felony offenses are demanding additional funding to expand jail
capacity in order to implement Realignment, rather than expanding the
rehabilitative alternatives the Legislature intended to encourage. 133
County officials are clearly crucial to making Realignment
successful. As Santa Clara Law Professor W. David Ball has noted:
California is one state; it is also fifty-eight counties. When it comes
to criminal justice and the state prison population, localities are
where the action is. County criminal justice budgets are much
larger than prison budgets, county officials make most of the key
decisions, and county responses to crime–not crime itself–drive
134
new felon admission rates.

And yet there is an inherent tension between the legislative intent
articulated in the Realignment legislation 135 and the stated goal of
Realignment: to “[p]rovide as much flexibility as possible to the level
of government providing the service.” 136 Although it makes sense for
the state to provide counties with some amount of discretion over how
they implement Realignment in their respective jurisdictions, the
legislation—with its lack of mandates, accountability mechanisms, or
funding incentives—sacrifices Realignment’s full potential in the name
of county autonomy and flexibility. 137

131. At least twenty counties already operate under court-ordered population caps. See
CAL. BD. OF CORR., JAIL PROFILE SURVEY ANNUAL REPORT 2004 7 (2004), available at
http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/fsod/jail%20profile%20summary/2004/2004_annual_report/2004
_JPS_Annual_Report.pdf [hereinafter JPS] (“According to the JPS [Jail Population Survey],
of the current 62 jurisdictions, 24 have court-ordered population caps. Those 24 jurisdictions
operate 67 facilities of which 58 have population caps. The 58 facilities with population
caps house 66.5% of the state’s ADP [or average daily state prison population].”).
132. Id.
133. See CAL. PENAL CODE §17.5(a).
134. W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does
Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 987, 1078 (2012).
135. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a) (codifying realignment’s legislative intent;
recognizing that “building and operating more prisons to address community safety
concerns [is] not sustainable, and will not result in improved public safety” and that
“California must reinvest its criminal justice resources to support community-based
corrections programs and evidence-based practices”).
136. See GOVERNOR’S BUDGET, supra note 98, at 72.
137. Regarding the broad discretion Realignment grants to counties, see ABARBANEL,
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For Realignment to succeed, the state must more effectively
oversee county Realignment programs and incentivize counties to
implement Realignment in a manner consistent with the legislative
intent and objectives underlying the legislation. Because counties have
largely been allowed to make their own decisions about whether to
embrace Realignment’s evidence-based approach and alternatives to
incarceration, many counties continue to rely upon incarceration as the
primary response to low-level, non-violent crime. 138
2. The State Failed to Include Sufficient Evaluation and
Accountability Mechanisms
The Realignment legislation lacks sufficient standardized data
collection and reporting requirements. The legislature tasked a state
agency, the Board of State and Community Corrections (“BSCC”),
with overseeing the implementation of Realignment, but left its specific
role and duties largely undefined. 139 Although the BSCC’s broad
supra note 4 (“Not only did AB 109 transfer an unprecedented amount of responsibility to
counties; it also gave them an unprecedented amount of discretion. The bill puts few limits
on how counties can spend their money, and it does not require them to report any results to
the state or to measure the outcomes of their programs. There are two explanations for this
grant of discretion: (1) It may have been necessary to get law enforcement buy-in to the bill,
and (2) There is some evidence that counties may be better situated to make decisions about
how
to
handle
offenders
in
their
jurisdictions.”).
See
also REBECCA SULLIVAN SILBERT, SENIOR LEGAL POLICY ASSOCIATE,
THE
CHIEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA,
BERKELEY,
SCHOOL
OF
LAW, THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT REALIGNMENT IN CALIFORNIA (Feb. 2012), available
at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/Thinking_Critically_3-14-2012.pdf
(“
[R]ealignment legislation contains no requirement that counties offer community
supervision, treatment, reentry services, or any other alternative. There is no state oversight
of realignment funding, and the money is unrestricted beyond the fact that it must be used
for realignment-related expenses. The hope of many is that counties will take advantage of
this opportunity to explore noncustodial options and community programs that keep people
from committing new crimes, thus creating better communities for all Californians. . . .
[H]owever, nothing in the state legislation stops counties from relying solely on increased
jail construction, which would be an opportunity wasted.").
138. See generally ACLU OF CAL., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT: CALIFORNIA AT A
CROSSROADS app. A (2012), available at
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/public_safety_realignment_california_at_a_cr
ossroads.pdf [hereinafter CROSSROADS]; ANGELA MCCRAY ET AL., REALIGNING THE
REVOLVING DOOR? AN ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA’S COUNTIES’ AB 109 IMPLEMENTATION
PLANS (DRAFT) 7–8 (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Realigning_the_Revolving_Door.pdf.
139. MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2012–13 BUDGET: THE 2011
REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS—AN UPDATE 13 (Feb. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/2011-realignment-of-adult-offenders-
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mission is to collect and disseminate data and information, provide
technical assistance to counties, and offer leadership in the area of
criminal justice policy, there is nothing in the Realignment legislation
specifying how the BSCC is to function, what data it is to collect, or
how it is to compel counties’ to report these data. 140 Without mandated
data collection, policy-makers are unable to monitor which policies are
working to reduce recidivism and reliance on incarceration, and then to
base future policy and budget decisions accordingly.
There have been some encouraging developments over the past
two years toward creating a more effective data collection, monitoring,
and dissemination role for the BSCC. In 2012, the state’s Legislative
Analyst’s Office recommended that the Legislature direct the BSCC to
create a working group “made up of representatives of the state,
counties, and the broader research community,” to focus on:
“(1) identifying the handful of key outcome measures that all counties
should collect, (2) clearly defining these measures to ensure that all
counties collect them uniformly, and (3) developing a process for
counties to report the data and for BSCC to make the data available to
the public.” 141
In 2013, the legislature enacted AB 1050, which requires the
BSCC to work with relevant stakeholders such as probation chiefs, the
Administrative Office of the Courts, and state sheriffs to develop
“definitions of specified key terms in order to facilitate consistency in
local data collection, evaluation, and implementation of evidence-based
programs.” 142 Additionally, the Budget Act of 2013 143 appropriated
$7,900,000 for the BSCC to allocate to counties that submitted, by
December 15, 2013, a report providing the BSCC information about
the county’s implementation of its local realignment plan, including
“progress in achieving outcome measures as identified in the plan or
otherwise available.” 144 In the same year, the BSCC also announced a
022212.pdf [hereinafter THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS].
140. Id.
141. THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS, supra note 139, at 19.
142. Legislative Analyst’s Digest, A.B. 1050, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013),
available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_10011050/ab_1050_bill_20130909_chaptered.pdf.
143. A.B. 110, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_01010150/ab_110_bill_20130627_chaptered.pdf.
144. BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT:
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP PLANS 1
(June
2013),
available
at
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/Report_on_the_Implementation_of_Community_
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collaborative research project with the Public Policy Institute of
California (“PPIC”). PPIC is working with ten counties and state
agencies to develop an individual-level data tracking system and help
build capacity at the BSCC and the counties to identify effective local
criminal justice system practices. 145
In spite of these encouraging steps, however, the state’s continued
failure to adequately monitor and report on county-level
implementation is significantly undermining Realignment’s
effectiveness. In a 2013 report, the LAO noted continued deficiencies
in the BSCC’s data collection and reporting:
The Legislature gave BSCC the mission of providing technical
assistance to counties with the goal of encouraging evidence–based
programs that improve criminal justice outcomes cost–effectively. .
. . BSCC has not yet played an active role in facilitating the
adoption of evidence–based programs. . . . [W]e believe more is
required in order to fulfill the Legislature’s intent when giving
BSCC its technical assistance mission, which was to proactively
encourage and facilitate the adoption of evidence–based practices
across the state. . . . [W]hile BSCC’s existing survey data provide
some useful, basic statistics about jail populations, the data are
otherwise incomplete. The surveys do not collect much information
on local agencies’ outcomes, such as completion rates for treatment
programs or offender recidivism rates. In addition, the survey
addendum related to realignment is limited because it does not
collect the full range of caseload information that would help to
assess realignment’s effects. . . . We are also concerned that BSCC
has not yet developed a longer–term plan to fulfill its data
collection mission. 146

Corrections_Partnership_Plans.pdf.
145. According to testimony provided by PPIC Research Fellow Ryken Grattet, “PPIC
researchers will work with the BSCC staff and 10 counties to gather the kind of data that
will allow us to take a very close look at the evolving realigned population. Beyond
anything that can be done now, this project will allow the state to see what is working and
what isn’t and why.” The Need for Public Safety Data Collection: Hearing before the
California Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Subcommittee No. 5 on Corrections, Public
Safety,
and
The
Judiciary
(Mar.
20,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ppic.org/main/testimony.asp?i=1339.
146. MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET: GOVERNOR’S
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
PROPOSALS
(Feb.
15,
2013),
available
at:
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/2011-realignment-of-adult-offenders022212.pdf. See also Brian Goldstein, Big Government Must Embrace Big Data, CTR. ON
JUVENILE
AND
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
(Nov.
19,
2013),
available
at
http://www.cjcj.org/news/6956 (noting problems with the BSCC’s data collection and
reporting concerning juvenile justice block grant funds).
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As Republican state Assemblywoman Melissa Melendez stated at
an April 2014 PPIC-sponsored panel discussion that also included
Senate President Pro Tem Darrell Steinberg and Matthew Cate, head of
the California State Association of Counties and former Secretary of
the CDCR, “We have a lot of programs out there. Nobody seems to be
able to tell me do they work. There has been no analysis.” 147
3.

The State’s Realignment Funding Formula Failed to
Sufficiently Incentivize Counties to Rely Less on Incarceration

The BSCC noted in a June 2013 report that, “[t]he passage of
Proposition 30 in 2012 established a dedicated revenue stream to fund
public safety services realigned to local government. In fiscal year
2011–12 and fiscal year 2012–13 respectively, counties received
$354,300,000 and $842,900,000 statewide for community corrections
programs to support the implementation of public safety realignment.
In fiscal years 2011–12 and 2012–13, $7,850,000 was allocated to
counties to support each local Community Corrections Partnership’s
(CCP) efforts in developing a local plan for the implementation of
realignment.” 148
However, the state has not implemented a system for allocating
these Realignment funds that incentivizes counties to reinvest resources
into alternatives to incarceration and to reduce rates of recidivism. 149
Instead, it has distributed Realignment implementation funds in a way
that rewards those counties that have historically relied most heavily on
incarceration. 150 Rather than allocate funding based on the county’s
147. Brad Branan, California Lawmakers Want More Data on Prison Realignment,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
CAPITOL
ALERT
(Apr.
21,
2014),
available
at
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2014/04/california-lawmakers-want-more-data-onprison-realignment.html#storylink=cpy.
148. BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT:
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP PLANS,
supra note 144, at 1.
149. See LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING
ALLOCATION
(May
12,
2014)
at
4-5,
available
at
http://budgettrack.blob.core.windows.net/btdocs2014/481.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC SAFETY
REALIGNMENT FUNDING ALLOCATION] (“[T]he current allocation method does not
necessarily provide an incentive for counties to achieve outcomes that are consistent with
legislative priorities.” The funding formula “impacts the success or failure of the
realignment of felony offenders, as well as the state’s ability to achieve certain policy goals
(such as reducing recidivism among realigned offenders and complying with the federal
court ordered prison population cap).”).
150. See DEAN MISCZYNSKI, RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP:
CORRECTIONS 27–28 (Aug. 2011), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_811DMR.pdf. See also CAL. DEP’T OF
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overall crime rates and public safety needs, or upon counties’
demonstrated willingness and ability to employ cost-effective
alternatives to incarceration, the state’s funding allocation formula has
been based predominately on the rate at which each individual county
historically sent people to state prison for low-level, non-violent
felonies. 151 Thus, the higher the past incarceration rate, the higher that
county’s piece of the funding pie.
In the first fiscal year of Realignment, sixty percent of each
county’s funding allocation was based on the county’s historical
average daily state prison population (“ADP”) of persons convicted of
low-level, non-violent offenses from the particular county; thirty
percent was based on the population of each county; and only ten
percent was based on each county’s demonstrated success at improving
the outcomes of individuals on probation. 152 In the second and third
years of Realignment, fiscal year 2012–13 and 2013–14, counties were
given the best result among three options in which funding was based
on: 1) the county’s adult population ages 18 to 64; 2) the status quo
formula of fiscal year 2011–12; or 3) weighted ADP. 153 Over a quarter
of counties benefited from the new weighted ADP option, in some
cases almost doubling what they would have received had their
allocation been based on county population. 154
The funding formula for year one, and that for years two and
three, provided proportionally more dollars to those counties—such as
FINANCE, 2011–2012 STATE BUDGET 2 (June 30, 2011), available at http://201112.archives.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf.
151. CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES, AB 109 ALLOCATIONS: RECOMMENDED
APPROACH FOR 2012–13 AND 2013–14 10 (May 14, 2012), available at
http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/12.05.15_ab_109_allocation051412_briefing_on_yrs_2_and_3_formula.pdf [hereinafter AB 109 ALLOCATIONS];
PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING ALLOCATION supra note 149 at 2-3.
152. See THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS, supra note 139, fig.5. The
last component of the formula refers to Senate Bill 678, also known as the California
Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act, which in 2009 created a fiscal
incentive for counties to improve probation outcomes. See S.B. 678, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228, 1233.4; CHIEF PROBATION OFFICERS OF
CAL., SB 678 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 1 (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/QuickLinks/sb678guide.pdf [hereinafter SB 678
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE] ; PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING ALLOCATION supra
note 149 at 2.
153. See AB 109 ALLOCATIONS, supra note 151, at 10; PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT
FUNDING ALLOCATION supra note 149 at 3.
154. Recommended AB 109 Allocation Years 2 and 3, CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES,
http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/fileattachments/12.05.16_attachments_1_and_2_for_5-14-12_caoac_briefing.pdf [hereinafter
Recommended AB 109 Allocation].
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Fresno, Kern, Kings, San Bernardino, Shasta, and Tulare—that have
historically sent higher rates of people convicted of low-level, nonviolent offenses to state prison. 155 Counties that had historically relied
more on local alternatives to incarceration—such as Alameda, Contra
Costa, Sacramento, San Diego, and San Francisco—received
proportionately less funding. 156 In effect, this funding formula
rewarded those county criminal justice policy choices that contributed
most to the state prison overcrowding crisis in the first place. In fiscal
year 2011–12, for example, San Francisco, with a population of about
805,000, received about $5.2 million while Tulare, with a population of
about half of San Francisco’s (442,000), received more Realignment
funding than San Francisco, about $5.9 million. 157 Similarly, Fresno,
with about 930,000 people, received over $9 million compared to
Contra Costa, with over a million people, which received about half as
much Realignment money, approximately $4.7 million. 158
While the funding formula for years two and three somewhat
limited the extent to which counties could capitalize on prior years’
ADP, significant disparities still exist. 159 These allocation differences
serve to underfund the counties that have contributed less to prison
overcrowding by implementing more evidence-based practices. For
example, in fiscal year 2012–13, San Diego, with a population of
3,140,069, received $59.1 million, while San Bernardino, with twothirds the population of San Diego, received $54.9 million.160

155. See id.; BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT
ACT: REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP
PLANS, supra note 144, at app.
156. Id.; Ball, supra note 134.
157. See State and County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html; CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2011–
12 AB 109 ALLOCATIONS, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/BASEREALIGNMENT-FUNDING.pdf; MCCRAY ET AL., supra note 138, app. 1.
158. Id.
159. AB 109 ALLOCATIONS, supra note 151; Recommended AB 109 Allocation, supra
note 154. See also BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT
ACT: REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP
PLANS, supra note 144, at app.
160. AB 109 ALLOCATIONS, supra note 151; Recommended AB 109 Allocation, supra
note 154; Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Counties and CountyEquivalents: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011, 2011 Population Estimates, United States Census
Bureau,
Population
Division
(Apr.
2012),
available
at
https://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/totals/2011/files/CO-EST2011-Alldata.csv.
See BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT: REPORT
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP PLANS, supra note
144, at app.
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Similarly, among smaller counties, Imperial received $3.1 million
while Kings, with a nearly identical countywide population and violent
crime rate, received twice as much—$5.9 million.161
This is problematic because a county’s historical ADP is a
reflection of the county’s past reliance upon incarceration in state
prison, instead of utilizing alternatives to incarceration like those
encouraged by Realignment. Professor Ball has conducted an extensive
analysis of the rates at which California counties have historically sent
people to state prison for felony convictions, and developed a ranking
of counties comparing county violent crime rates to the rates at which
they sent people to prison over a ten year period. 162 The counties Ball
denotes as “high use” counties have a greater disparity than other
counties between their violent crime rate and imprisonment rate; that
is, “high use” counties sent people to prison at higher rates than other
counties with comparable violent crime rates. 163 In other words, it is
not a simple matter of counties with more violent crime sending more
people to prison, nor is it that counties achieve lower violent crime
rates by sending more people to prison. For example, Ball notes that
Alameda and San Bernardino Counties have similar population levels
and similar violent crime levels. 164 Yet, over the past ten years, San
Bernardino sent more than twice the number of people to state prison
as Alameda County. 165 As Professor Ball points out, “California’s
prison overcrowding is due in large part to county decisions about how
to deal with crime . . . California’s counties use state prison resources
at dramatically different rates . . . .” 166 It therefore does not make sense
to continue rewarding counties for maintaining unnecessarily bloated
custodial populations, rather than incentivizing smart-on-crime policies
that focus on alternatives to incarceration and recidivism reduction.
It might be argued that the counties who have used state prison at
higher rates for the Realignment class of offenses need more state
funding assistance to implement Realignment, both because these
counties have more people to supervise on PRCS and because these
161. See Recommended AB 109 Allocation, supra note 154; CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMES AND CRIME RATES, 2001–2010 (KINGS) (2010), available at
http://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc-stats/2010/table1; CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMES AND CRIME
RATES, 2001–2010 (IMPERIAL) (2010), available at http://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjscstats/2010/table1.
162. Ball, supra note 134, at 1014.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 994–95.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 987.

HOPPER FINAL

2014]

8/21/2014 4:04 PM

CA CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT

565

counties have less pre-existing non-carceral infrastructure and
programming in place. There are at least two problems with this
argument. First, the PRCS load on the counties resulting from their preRealignment state prison ADP will be a temporary burden, since the
maximum terms of post-release supervision for these offenses is three
years. 167 Second, this argument would be more persuasive if Ball’s
“high use” counties had used significant portions of the state
Realignment funding they have received thus far to start building their
capacity to provide alternatives to incarceration. But this has not been
the case. Instead, these counties have spent far higher proportions on
expanding jail capacity, and correspondingly lower proportions for
non-carceral alternatives, than their sister counties. 168 A review of the
counties’ first year Realignment budgets showed that of the twenty-five
counties receiving the most state Realignment dollars, ten were among
Ball’s “high use” counties. 169 Those ten counties spent an average of at
least thirty percent of their Realignment funds to expand jail
capacity. 170
Rather than relying upon prior years’ ADP to drive so much of the
state Realignment funding allocation decisions, the state could create a
funding scheme that better incentivizes counties to reduce their

167. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3451.
168. See generally CROSSROADS, supra note 138, app. A; MCCRAY ET AL., supra note
138.
169. Those 10 counties are Fresno, Kern, Orange, Placer, Riverside, San Bernardino,
Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Kings and Shasta. Kings County plans to spend an astonishing
70 percent of its entire AB 109 allocation on expanding jail capacity, and is also seeking
additional state funds under AB 900 for additional jail construction. CROSSROADS, supra
note 138, app. A. See also ABARBANEL, supra note 4.
170. This thirty percent figure almost certainly underestimates the amounts being spent
to expand jail capacity, because it is based upon specific amounts explicitly identified in the
county Realignment plans; many of the plans, however, do not provide specific budgeted
amounts for jail capacity expansion despite clear indications in the plans that such expansion
is indeed in the works. The thirty percent figure does not include any amount from Orange
County’s plan, for instance, but that plan allocates to the Sheriff $13.6 million of its overall
$23 million (or about fifty-nine percent) without specifying how much of this will go to
expand jail capacity. The plan does note, however, that two facilities are currently partially
closed due to a low jail census and ongoing repair work, and it is anticipated that all jail
facilities will need to be fully operational within six to twelve months, which will require
additional jail staffing and resources. Orange County’s plan also contemplates applying for
AB 900 funding to support the construction of approximately 750 new jail beds. See CMTY
CORR. P’SHIP EXEC. COMM., ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND
POSTRELEASE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (Oct. 2011),
available at http://calrealignment.org/component/docman/doc_download/79-orange-countyplan.html?Itemid.
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recidivism rates. 171 For instance, the California Community
Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009 created a fiscal
incentive for counties to improve probation outcomes. 172 The statute
created a funding stream under which counties received funding for
probation based on their success in reducing the percentage of
probationers sent to state prison compared to a baseline percentage that
each sent to prison between 2006 and 2008.173 Although the statute
gave broad discretion to each county as to how to best implement
evidence-based practices to decrease the number of probationers sent to
state prison, counties were incentivized to improve their probation
outcome in order to get increased funding. 174
The state could similarly revise the Realignment allocation
formula to incentivize counties to reduce recidivism and increase use of
cost-effective alternatives to incarceration. Once county-level outcome
data is collected and reported throughout the state on a regular and
uniform basis, the funding formula could be based upon these data,
thereby creating incentives for counties to adopt the policies and
programs that are demonstrated to work best.
Unfettered discretion, lack of formal mechanisms for
accountability, and lack of incentives have resulted in uneven
Realignment implementation across the state. Some counties have
begun taking the evidence-based path that will reduce recidivism and
improve public safety. 175 However, many others continue to rely
almost exclusively on incarceration, increasing their jail capacities
rather than reducing population through strategies like pretrial release
and alternative sanctions contemplated under Realignment, such as
split sentencing with a mandatory supervision tail, electronic
monitoring of sentenced defendants and other community supervision
options for both pretrial and sentenced individuals. 176 Because many
counties are not pursuing evidence-based alternatives to custody, the
171. See PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING ALLOCATION supra note 149 at 5.
172. See S.B. 678, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228,
1233.4; SB 678 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 152, at 1; THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF
ADULT OFFENDERS, supra note 139, at 15.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See County Realignment Dashboard, CHIEF PROBATION OFFICERS OF CAL.,
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/dashboard_county.swf (last updated Apr. 8, 2014).
176. Id. For example, the statewide split sentencing rate was only 27.7 percent in from
October 2012 through September 2013. See California Realignment Dashboard, supra note
14. Very few counties have allocated Realignment funds to start pretrial release programs
and very few have begun to make good use of electronic monitoring for both pretrial and
sentenced individuals. See CROSSROADS, supra note 138, app. A.
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total number of people incarcerated in the state is much higher than it
could be. 177
While California’s prison population has fallen by nearly 25,000
since the enactment of Realignment, the state has awarded counties
$1.7 billion 178 to expand jail capacity and counties have added
thousands of new beds to their jails. 179 In addition, there are current
efforts underway to spend $500 million more to further expand
counties jails. 180 This explosion of jail expansion flies in the face of the
express legislative intent of Realignment: to implement proven
recidivism-reducing policies, focusing on alternatives to
incarceration. 181 There are a number of potential ramifications of the
shift of the overcrowding problem from the state to the counties.
Counties with incarceration-focused Realignment plans, many of which
are already under court-ordered population caps, are in danger of
facing mini-Plata lawsuits. 182 Another pressing concern is that jails
177. See County Realignment Dashboard, supra note 175; CROSSROADS, supra note
138; MCCRAY ET AL., supra note 138.
178. In AB 900 authorized the state to grant $1.2 billion to counties to expand jail
capacity. A.B. 900, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). In 2012, the Legislature
allocated another $500 million to counties to further expand their jail capacity. S.B. 1022,
2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
179. See CROSSROADS, supra note 138, at 12; CAL. BD. OF CORR., AB 900 PHASE II
COUNTY JAIL CONSTRUCTION OR EXPANSION APPLICATION SUMMARIES JANUARY 11,
2012
(updated
Sept.
2012),
available
at
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/AB_900_Project_Status_Update_for_BSCC_web
_082213.pdf; CAL. CORR. STANDARDS AUTHORITY, AB 900 PHASE I JAIL CONSTRUCTION
FUNDING AWARDS, UPDATED DECEMBER 9, 2013 (Dec. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/AB_900_Phase_I_Awards_2013-12-09.pdf; CAL.
BD. OF CORR., AB 900 PHASE II – JAIL CONSTRUCTION FUNDING AWARDS UPDATED
JANUARY
16,
2014
(Jan.
16,
2014),
available
at
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/AB_900_Phase_II_Awards_2014-01-16.pdf;
CAL. BD. OF CORR., SB 1022 ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACILITIES, PROPOSALS RECEIVED
BY
OCTOBER
24,
2013
(Nov.
13,
2013),
available
at
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/SB-1022_Proposal_Summary.pdf; CAL. BD. OF
CORR., SB 1022 ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACILITIES, SB 1022 ADULT LOCAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION FUNDING AWARDS (Mar. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/SB_1022_Conditional_Award_List_(2).pdf.
180. In the Governor’s current 2014–15 Budget Summary, he proposes “that another
$500 million be authorized for SB 1022-type facilities.” EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 2014–15
GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY, To the California Legislature, Regular Session 2013–14
(Jan.
10,
2014)
at
84,
available
at
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/201415/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf.
181. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a).
182. In December 2011, the Prison Law Office filed a class action lawsuit against the
Fresno Sheriff on behalf of jail inmates denied mental health care and medical treatment for
life-threatening illnesses. As in Plata, the plaintiffs alleged cruel and unusual conditions in
violation of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Complaint, Hall v.
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were never designed for long-term incarceration. As a result, many
inmates receive inadequate access to exercise, rehabilitation
programming, medical and mental health care, and family visits. In
addition, county jails may not be sufficiently equipped to meet the
ADA needs that come with increased populations. As such, they may
face a plethora of lawsuits.183 As one commentator has warned:
The ever-present risk of realignment is that it could turn the Plata/
Coleman court order into a shell game instead of a solution to
California’s incarceration conditions problem. Medical and mental
health care in California’s prisons was indisputably horrendous, but
population reduction is finally allowing the other substantive parts
of the remedies to work. This achievement would be far less
significant if the order turned out to dump on the counties not just
population, but the unconstitutional conditions that, in California’s
prisons, accompanied population. Call this the potential hydra
problem: chopping the head off of unconstitutional prison
conditions could cause many of the 58 counties to in turn develop
184
unconstitutional conditions of jail confinement.

4. The Realignment Legislation Does Not Address the Pretrial
Detention Problem
It is clear that Realignment’s success is inextricably tied to the
capacity of county criminal justice systems to meet their new
obligations. Critics of Realignment have argued that many county jails

Mims, No. 1:11-cv-02047-LJO-BAM, 2012 WL 1498893 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2011).
Similarly, in the 1970s and 80s, when the Fifth Circuit found Texas prisoners’ Eighth
Amendment rights were violated and ordered remedial measures be taken to reduce the
prison population, these actions led to increased crowding in Texas county jails. See, e.g.,
Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris Cnty., Tex., 937 F.2d 984, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing
how a proposed remedy to the Texas prison overcrowding crisis required convicted felons
sentenced to the state’s prison system to stay longer in county jail while they awaited
transfer to prison, thereby leading to dangerously overcrowded county jails); see also Ruiz v.
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (1982) (requiring the state to take remedial measures to reduce prison
overcrowding).
183. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d 124 F.3d
1019 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the CDCR was violating the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Rehabilitation Act and issuing an injunction requiring the CDCR to improve
access to prison programs for prisoners with physical disabilities at all of California’s
prisons and parole facilities). See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Legal Servs. for Prisoners with
Children v. Ahern, No. RG12656266, (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 15, 2012) (alleging systemic
and long-term discrimination against persons with disabilities housed at Santa Rita Jail has
resulted in unequal treatment of and severe harm to those inmates).
184. Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown And Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, And
Politics 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., (forthcoming Jan. 2013) (manuscript at 44–49); see
also Alberti, 937 F.2d 984; Ruiz, 679 F.2d 1115.
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are themselves overcrowded, and therefore unable to absorb newly
sentenced defendants who would previously have been sent to state
prison. 185 County jails, however, are not full of individuals who have
been convicted of crimes, or even individuals deemed to present a high
public safety risk to the community. Most people in county jails have
not been convicted of the charges against them. Instead, more than
sixty-three percent of the 82,000 Californians held in county jails on
any given day are awaiting their day in court.186 A substantial amount
of them remain incarcerated pending trial or other case disposition not
because they pose a significant risk to public safety, but because they
simply cannot afford bail. 187
High rates of pretrial detention are a threat to public safety and
civil liberties. People with financial resources are able to get out of jail
and return to their jobs, families, and communities. People who are
unable to pay for bail or raise the necessary collateral, however, must
stay in jail awaiting a trial date that could be months away. Or, they
may more readily decide to accept a plea bargain as a means of getting
out of jail. New research also indicates defendants detained for the
entire pretrial period are much more likely to be sentenced to jail and

185. See Kurtis Alexander, Fresno County Demands More State Funds for Housing
Prisoners, FRESNO BEE (Dec. 2, 2012),
http://www.fresnobee.com/2012/12/02/3086872/valley-counties-seek-more-prison.html;
Letter from thirteen Central Valley legislators to the Honorable Jerry Brown (Dec. 5, 2012),
available at http://news.fresnobeehive.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/RealignmentCoalition-Letter-Central-Valley.pdf; Kurtis Alexander, Valley Lawmakers Ask Governor for
More Prison Money, FRESNO BEE (Dec. 8, 2012),
http://news.fresnobeehive.com/archives/731.
186. See CAL. BD. OF CORR., JAIL PROFILE SURVEY, SECOND QUARTER CALENDAR
YEAR 2013 7 (2013), available at
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/2013_2nd_Qtr_JPS_full_report.pdf.
187. Trial judges are required to evaluate defendants’ suitability for bail and to order
held without bail those deemed to present too great a risk to public safety. This makes sense:
if someone is deemed a public safety risk, the mere fact that they may be able to come up
with money for bail does not mitigate that risk. By setting bail for a defendant, a judge is
indicating that releasing that defendant pending trial does not present an unreasonable public
safety risk. A substantial and increasing number of defendants held in jail pending trial have
had bail set but cannot afford to post it. They therefore remain in jail not because they pose a
threat to public safety but rather because they cannot afford bail. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275;
see PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., RATIONAL AND TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION MAKING:
MOVING FROM A CASH-BASED TO A RISK-BASED PROCESS 1, 3 (2012), available at
http://www.pretrial.org/Featured%20Resources%20Documents/Rational%20and%20Transp
arent%20Bail%20Decision%20Making.pdf; see also JOHN CLARK, THE IMPACT OF MONEY
BAIL ON JAIL BED USAGE, AMERICAN JAILS 47–48 (July/Aug., 2010), available at
http://www.pretrial.org/wp-content/uploads/filebase/pjireports/AJA%20Money%20Bail%20Impact%202010.pdf.
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prison and are also likely to receive longer sentences.188 These results
have nothing to do with public safety. They have everything to do with
wealth and poverty. People with money are able to buy their freedom
while poor people cannot.
One contributor to California’s high rate of pretrial detention is
the State’s reliance on money-bail. 189 This reliance on money-bail is in
contrast to other jurisdictions which have more expansive presumptions
in favor of own recognizance (“O.R.”) release and in which nonfinancial release, rather than money-bail, is the default. 190 Another
188. See CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND AND ALEXANDER
INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING
(Nov.
2013),
available
at
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF_Report_statesentencing_FNL.pdf.
189. See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, RATIONAL AND TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION
MAKING: MOVING FROM A CASH-BASED TO A RISK-BASED PROCESS 1,3 (Mar. 2012),
available
at
http://www.pretrial.org/download/featured/Rational%20and%20Transparent%20Bail%20De
cision%20Making.pdf (“The data indicates that money bail is for many defendants the cause
for pretrial detention. In 1990, money bonds were being set in 53 percent of felony cases. By
2006, that figure had jumped to 70 percent. As the use of money bonds has gone up, pretrial
release rates have gone down. In 1990, 65 percent of felony defendants were released while
awaiting trial, compared to 58 percent in 2006.” (citations omitted); also noting citing
figures showing that seven out of ten felony defendants nationwide are required to post a
money bond to be released pending trial). California’s pretrial population is at 63% of total
jail population, or 82,000 persons and from 2002 to 2012, county bail levels for the most
frequently committed felony offenses increased by an inflation-adjusted 22 percent. See
SONYA M. TAFOYA, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF BAIL ON
CALIFORNIA’S
JAIL
POPULATION
at
15
(June
2013),
available
at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_613STR.pdf. The latest Bureau of Justice
Statistics report shows that 69 percent of the pretrial detainees in Los Angeles County are
held in lieu of bail, 68 percent are held in lieu of bail in Orange, 48 percent are held in lieu
of bail in San Bernardino, and 59 percent are held in lieu of bail in Ventura. See THOMAS H.
COHEN & TRACY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS
IN
LARGE
URBAN
COUNTIES,
2006
25,
37
(2010),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf. A study of felony defendants in
America’s 75 largest urban counties showed that in 1990, release on recognizance accounted
for 42 percent of releases, compared to 25 percent released on surety bond. By 2006, the
proportions had been reversed: surety bonds were used for 43% of releases, compared to 25
percent for release on recognizance. So it is clear that the majority of pretrial release
involves money-bail. See Conference of State Court Administrators, 2012-2013 Policy
Paper
Evidence-Based
Pretrial
Release,
available
at
http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources/Ref/EBPre-TrialRelease_2012.pdf
(citing THOMAS H. COHEN AND KYCKELHAHN, T., WASHINGTON D.C.: US DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PLANNING, BUREAU OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 2).
190. See CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, 2012–2013 POLICY PAPER
EVIDENCE-BASED
PRETRIAL
RELEASE,
available
at
http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources/Ref/EBPre-TrialRelease_2012.pdf
HOLSINGER,
OUTCOMES
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contributor is California’s system of fixed bail schedules, under which
the superior court in each county is required to create and adopt a
county-wide bail schedule for all bailable felony offenses and all
misdemeanor and infractions. 191 Bail schedules by their very nature are
based primarily on the seriousness of the offense charged and do not
reflect any individual assessment concerning probability of appearance
or risk to public safety. Although California law mandates an
individualized determination in setting, reducing or denying bail, 192
California’s reliance on these money-based bail schedules has warped
into a presumptive bail system.
All the while, there is no evidence that defendants’ ability to
afford bail correlates to their risk of committing a new crime while out
on bail, or even their likelihood of appearing in court. Instead there are
demonstrated other means by which a court can fulfill its job of
ensuring a defendant’s appearance at a next court appearance and
protecting public safety. For example, pretrial risk assessment research
over the past thirty years indicates that there are common factors, such
as prior failure to appears, prior convictions and whether the defendant
has a pending case at the time of arrest, that can help predict court

(Explaining that “[t]welve states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have
enacted a statutory presumption that defendants charged with bailable offenses should be
released on personal recognizance or unsecured bond unless a judicial officer makes an
individual determination that the defendant poses a risk that requires more restrictive
conditions or detention” and citing the federal statute and D.C. code and statutes from
Washington D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wisconsin; Also noting that “[s]ix other
states have adopted this presumption by court rule,” citing rules from Arizona, Minnesota,
New Mexico, North Dakota, D.C. and Wyoming). California’s statute contains a
presumption of OR release only for misdemeanants. Although the statute permits a court to
release others on their own recognizance there is no encouragement to do so, nor guidelines
suggesting least restrictive methods of release. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270(a) (“Any
person who has been arrested for, or charged with, an offense other than a capital offense
may be released on his or her own recognizance by a court or magistrate who could release a
defendant from custody upon the defendant giving bail, including a defendant arrested upon
an out-of-county warrant. A defendant who is in custody and is arraigned on a complaint
alleging an offense which is a misdemeanor, and a defendant who appears before a court or
magistrate upon an out-of-county warrant arising out of a case involving only
misdemeanors, shall be entitled to an own recognizance release unless the court makes a
finding on the record, in accordance with Section 1275, that an own recognizance release
will compromise public safety or will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant
as required. Public safety shall be the primary consideration. If the court makes one of those
findings, the court shall then set bail and specify the conditions, if any, whereunder the
defendant shall be released.”).
191. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269b(c).
192. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275.
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appearance and/or likelihood of re-arrest while awaiting trial. 193 These
factors can be assessed through the application of an evidence-based
risk assessment tool, which many jurisdictions currently use as part of
the process of assessing defendants and making release
recommendations to the court. 194 This assessment can assist the court
in making a determination as to whether a defendant should be released
on O.R. with no supervision, released on O.R. with some supervision
and conditions, or in limited circumstances remain incarcerated—all
without reliance on the charge-based bail schedule. Many jurisdictions
using risk assessment tools and pretrial programs to assess and release
defendants on non-financial terms have shown great success as
measured by high court appearance rates and low rates of re-arrest. 195
The bottom line is that a focus on money-bail rather than any
meaningful assessment of the defendant or evaluation of potential risk
means that many people who present little-to-no public safety or
“failure to appear” danger remain unnecessarily behind bars pending
trial. U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder recently agreed, noting in
2011 that “[a]lmost all of these [non-sentenced, pretrial] individuals
could be released and supervised in their communities—and allowed to
pursue or maintain employment, and participate in educational
opportunities and their normal family lives—without risk of

193. See MARIE VANNOSTRAND AND CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, ASSESSING
PRETRIAL RISK WITHOUT A DEFENDANT INTERVIEW (Nov. 2013), available at
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF_Report_nointerview_FNL.pdf. The list factors include things such as: whether the defendant had a
pending case at the time of arrest; whether the defendant had an active warrant for failure to
appear at the time of arrest or a history of failure to appear; and whether the defendant had
prior misdemeanor, felony or violent crime convictions. Some jurisdictions around the
country also look at factors such as residence stability; employment stability; community
ties; and history of substance abuse. However, the recent VanNostrand and Lowenkamp
research indicates that the dynamic factors in an assessment, such as employment and
residence, may be less predictive or not predictive at all. Id.
194. See, e.g., CAFWD: PARTNERSHIP FOR COMMUNITY EXCELLENCE, PRETRIAL
DETENTION & COMMUNITY SUPERVISION: BEST PRACTICES AND RESOURCES FOR
CALIFORNIA
COUNTIES
14–18
(Sept.
2012),
available
at
http://caforward.3cdn.net/7a60c47c7329a4abd7_2am6iyh9s.pdf; Report on Status of
Pretrial Program Santa Cruz County, dated September 12, 2013, presented to the Board of
Supervisors
(Sept.
24,
2013),
available
at
http://sccounty01.co.santacruz.ca.us/bds/Govstream/BDSvData/non_legacy/agendas/2013/20130924/PDF/025.pdf;
CRIME AND JUSTICE INSTITUTE AT COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR JUSTICE, YOLO COUNTY
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF REALIGNMENT PLAN STRATEGIES (May 2013), available at
http://www.yolocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=22762.
195. See, e.g., CAFWD: PARTNERSHIP FOR COMMUNITY EXCELLENCE, supra note 194;
Report on Status of Pretrial Program Santa Cruz County, supra note 194; CRIME AND
JUSTICE INSTITUTE AT COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR JUSTICE, supra note 194.
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endangering their fellow citizens or fleeing from justice.” 196 In order
for California to meaningfully address its jail overcrowding problem,
especially in light of the additional burdens Realignment places on
local criminal justice systems, counties must transition away from the
unfair and ineffective money-based bail system.
Examples of sensible state law reforms include amending pretrial
detention laws to expand the presumption of O.R. release that currently
exists for misdemeanors to those charged with non-violent, non-serious
felonies and mandating greater use of non-financial release across-theboard. County-based reforms should include creating comprehensive
pretrial release programs that use evidence-based criminal justice
practices and validated risk assessment tools to assist the court in
making fair and informed pretrial release decisions, and provide
supervision and services to releasees where appropriate.197 Reforms
should also ensure that defendants are represented by counsel at initial
appearance when release determinations are made, provide adequate
staffing and training and mandate data collection and analysis to
evaluate the effectiveness of the programs.
IV.

AFTER REALIGNMENT: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE THREE YEARS SINCE REALIGNMENT WAS ENACTED

The State itself was eventually forced to acknowledge that
Realignment alone could never reduce the prison population to the
levels mandated by the Plata court. 198 In early 2013, with the two-year
196. Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Symposium on Pretrial
Justice (June 1, 2011), available at
http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/criminaljustice/CR203800/Pages/pretrialjustice_hold
er.aspx.
197. Examples of successful pretrial programs include the Allegheny County bail
agency and the D.C. Bail Project. See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE
INSTITUTE GUIDES INNOVATIVE REFORMS, HELPING JUSTICE TRUMP TRADITION: NEW
AGENCY IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA INCREASES PRETRIAL FAIRNESS AND
SAFETY,
CASE
STUDIES
FALL
2008
at
3,
available
at
http://pretrial.org/Success/Case%20Study%201%20Allegheny%20County.pdf
(“With
technical assistance from the Pretrial Justice Institute, the agency has established one of the
nation’s most innovative pretrial programs.”); PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE D.C. PRETRIAL
SERVICES AGENCY: LESSONS FROM FIVE DECADES OF INNOVATION AND GROWTH, CASE
STUDIES FALL 2008 at 1, available at
http://www.pretrial.org/Reports/PJI%20Reports/Case%20Study%202%20%20DC%20Pretrial%20Services.pdf (“The agency is also a model nationally for
demonstrating that the vision for pretrial justice outlined in the standards of the American
Bar Association and the National Association of Pretrial Services
Agencies can be achieved.”).
198. See, e.g., Defendant’s Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to
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Supreme Court deadline approaching, the State had reduced the prison
population by about 23,000, bringing it to about 150 percent of design
capacity. 199 But the initially steep drop-off in prisoner population had
plateaued. 200
Nonetheless, the State asked the three-judge court to end federal
oversight of its prisons. 201 The State argued that the CDCR could
provide constitutionally adequate medical care at 149.6 percent of
design capacity 202 and claimed that improvements in prisoner medical
services had rectified any previous constitutional deficiencies. 203 The
State further argued that all California prisons were at least
“moderately” adhering to the policies and procedures on which the

Achieve Required Prison Population Reduction, supra note 25, at 1; Defendant’s Motion to
Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 5, at 1. See also Three-Judge
Court Updates, supra note 25. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’
Statement in Response to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra
note 18, at 2.
199. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra
note 5, at 8 (“As of December 26, 2012, 119,327 inmates were housed in the State’s 33 adult
institutions, which amounts to 149.6% of design bed capacity.”); Declaration of Jeffrey
Beard, Ph.D., In Support of Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction
Order, supra note 130, at 3.
200. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to
October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18, at 2–3 (figures
illustrate that the impact of Realignment has hit a plateau); see also Plaintiffs’ Statement in
Response to October 11, 2012 Order Re Population Reduction at 2, Plata v. Brown, 922 F.
Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351).
201. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra
note 5, at 21.
202. The State moved to vacate the Court’s order to reduce the prison population to
137.5 percent of design capacity. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population
Reduction Order, supra note 5, at 8; Declaration of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 130, at 3.
But cf. Receiver’s Respo§nse to Defendants’ Objections to Receiver’s 22nd Report at 5,
Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351) (according to J. Clark
Kelso, the federal receiver overseeing healthcare at the CDCR, “[t]he bottom one-third of
the institutions—the institutions which the Receiver’s QMC [Quality Management
Committee] has determined have the greatest need for improvement—had an average
population density of 155%. These numbers make it clear that overcrowding is still having a
direct impact upon the ability to deliver quality healthcare.”); see also id., Exhibit 1
(summarizing performance improvements and targeted support by institution); id., Exhibit 2
(demonstrating population by CDCR facility).
203. See Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify the Population Reduction Order at 16,
Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351) (concluding that all
CDCR prisons are meeting the Inspector General’s “moderate adherence standard” for
constitutional medical care and over half of the institutions are meeting the “high
adherence” standard). See also Declaration of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 130, at 4–
5.
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Plata court’s injunction is based, and over half had met the Inspector
General’s “high adherence” standard.204 According to the State, any
additional steps beyond those already implemented to reduce the prison
population were impossible without significantly endangering public
safety. 205 The State therefore requested that the court rescind its
population cap order. 206
At a press conference on January 8, 2013, Governor Edmund G.
Brown Jr. repeated publicly the assertions that the State had made in its
recent court filing, dramatically proclaiming that “the prison
emergency is over in California” and rescinding previous Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s declaration of a state of emergency. 207
Despite the State’s legal arguments and the Governor’s theatrics,
in April 2013, the Plata three-judge court refused to increase the 137.5
percent cap. The court did, however, grant the State a six-month
extension to December 2013 to meet the population target. 208 Under
204. Id.
205. Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note
5, at 2. See Declaration of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support of Defendants’ Motion to Vacate
or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 130, at 7 (“Continued enforcement of the
137.5 percent number—in addition to being unnecessary—would also come at a significant
cost to the State, and to public safety. Realignment implemented the safest prisonerreduction measures by shifting lower level offenders to local control, while leaving more
serious offenders in prison. The further reductions needed to reach the 137.5% level cannot
be achieved without the early release of inmates convicted of violent or serious felonies.”)
(emphasis added); Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify the Population Reduction
Order, supra note 203, at 20.
206. Id.
207. See Governor Jerry Brown on State Prisons, THE CAL. CHANNEL (Jan. 8, 2013),
http://www.calchannel.com/governor-jerry-brown-on-state-prisons/ (video of Governor
Brown calling for end to federal court monitoring, waving his Proclamation for assembled
reporters and pointing to a nearby table piled high with legal filings from the litigation);
California Challenges Federal Oversight of Prisons, KQED (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.kqed.org/a/forum/R201301090900 (audio file of Forum program hosted by
Michael Krasny with Guests: Governor Jerry Brown, Joan Petersilia, criminologist and codirector of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center; Rebekah Evenson, staff attorney with the
Prison Law Office; and Terri McDonald, undersecretary of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation; includes statement of Governor Brown asserting, “We’ve
gone from serious constitutional problems to one of the finest prison systems in the United
States.”); Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, supra note 96;
Proclamation Terminating the Prison Overcrowding Proclamation, supra note 96; Allen
Hopper, Despite Declaration, Prison Crisis Not Over Yet, DAILY J. (Jan. 23, 2013) (photo of
Governor Brown holding up the proclamation he signed declaring the end to the prison
overcrowding emergency).
208. See Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify
Population Reduction Order, supra note 95, at 2 (the order gives the state a six-month
extension; the State now has until December 31, 2013 to meet the 137.5 percent population
cap).
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protest, the State submitted a “population reduction plan” as ordered by
the three-judge court, 209 setting out several additional steps the State
could take to get closer to the 137.5 percent cap. The three-judge court
affirmed its prior orders requiring the State to meet the 137.5 percent
population cap by the end of 2013, and added specific steps the State
was required to take, including sending more prisoners to firefighting
camps, increasing good-time credits for nonviolent individuals, and
paroling geriatric prisoners. 210 The order also permitted the State to
lease cells at county jails and continue housing inmates in private outof-state prisons. 211 The three-judge court further ordered the State to
develop a list of the lowest risk prisoners who could be released if the
State’s other population-reduction measures failed to reduce the prison
population to the 137.5 percent ceiling by December 31, 2013. 212 The
State appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court and applied for a
stay of injunctive relief pending final disposition of the appeals.213 The
Supreme Court denied the stay, and subsequently denied the State’s
petition for review, leaving the December 2013 deadline in place. 214
A. The Enactment of SB 105
In late August 2013, with little time remaining to meet the threejudge court’s December 2013 deadline, the Governor, with the support
of Assembly Democrats, introduced Senate Bill 105 as the state’s new
plan to supplement Realignment and reduce prison overcrowding
enough to meet the Plata requirements. The original terms of SB 105
would have allowed the state to increase prison capacity by 12,500
beds through contracts with out-of-state and private in-state facilities
and suspended the closure of the California Rehabilitation Center. 215
This would all have come with a price tag to taxpayers of over $715
209. See Amended Defendants’ Response to April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List of
Proposed Population Reduction Measures; Court-Ordered Plan at 5–28, Plata v. Brown, 922
F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351); Opinion and Order Requiring Defendants
to Implement Amended Plan at 48, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
(No. 01-1351).
210. See Opinion and Order Requiring Defendants to Implement Amended Plan, supra
note 209.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States at 2–3, Plata v.
Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351); Application for Stay of
Injunctive Relief Pending This Court’s Final Disposition of Appeals Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1253, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351).
214. Brown v. Plata, 134 S. Ct. 1 (2013).
215. See S.B. 105, supra note 11 (introduced Aug. 27, 2013).
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million over two years, 216 which would have been inconceivable in
2011 when the Supreme Court had issued its Plata ruling. 217 However,
it was feasible in 2013, when improvements in the state’s fiscal
situation resulted in an estimated budget surplus of $2.4 billion. 218
Under the legislation, authority for these contracts would sunset in
January 2017; however, the Governor’s stated plan was to enter into
these contracts only through June 2015. 219 Among other concerns, the
Legislative Analyst’s Office found that this plan was extremely costly
and would likely result in short term compliance with the court order
but would fail to create a durable solution to the prison overcrowding
crisis. 220
Approximately a week after SB 105 was introduced, a competing
bill authored by Senate President pro Tem Darrell Steinberg was
introduced as the Senate Democrats’ alternative to the Governor’s
plan. 221 Steinberg’s bill, AB 84, proposed to seek a settlement with
plaintiffs’ attorneys that would have included a three-year extension to
meet the population cap, established a grant program incentivizing
counties to reduce probation revocations to state prison by increasing
local programming, and created an advisory commission on public
safety that would advise the Legislature and the Governor on durable
strategies for reaching and maintaining the mandated population cap. 222
On September 9, 2013, the Governor and Senator Steinberg
announced they reached a compromise, 223 and a few days later the
Governor signed into law an amended version of SB 105. 224 The
approved legislation cut the originally proposed allocation to CDCR
216. See id.; ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON POPULATION CAP, supra note
11, at 2.
217. See 2011–12 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 8.
218. See MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET (Nov. 2013) at
7-8, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/bud/spending-plan/spending-plan073013.pdf [hereinafter LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET].
219. See ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON POPULATION CAP, supra note 11,
at 2.
220. Id. at 3–6.
221. A.B. 84, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (introduced Sept. 3, 2013)
(noting, “Governor’s Plan Addresses Short-Term, But Not Long-Term Problem”).
222. See id.; ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON POPULATION CAP, supra note
11 at 7.
223. See, e.g., Chris Megerian, Deal brokered on plan to ease California prison
crowding, LA TIMES (Sept. 9, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/09/local/la-melegislature-prisons-20130910.
224. S.B. 105, supra note 11; CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 19050.2, 19050.8; CAL. PENAL
CODE. §§ 1233.1, 1233.3, 1233.4, 1233.9, 2910, 2915, 6250.2, 11191, 13602; 2012 Cal.
Stat. § 15, ch. 42 (Cal. 2013).
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from $715 million to $315 million and requires that the department
spend the funds only to the extent needed to avoid early release of
prisoners under the Plata order. Any amounts from this $315 million
not encumbered by June 30, 2014 are to be transferred to a new
Recidivism Reduction Fund. 225 SB 105 also authorized the CDCR to
enter into contracts for prisoner housing with out-of-state and privately
run in-state prisons, allowed for the involuntary transfer of prisoners to
out-of-state facilities, and created incentives for counties to implement
local programs that reduce probation revocations to prison. 226
Following the passage of SB 105 and the Supreme Court’s refusal
to hear the State’s request to do away with the 137.5 percent population
cap, 227 the State asked the three-judge court for a three-year extension
to reduce the prison population. 228 The three-judge court ordered the
State and plaintiffs to work together to reach an agreement about the
extension and temporarily extended the population reduction deadline
to January 27, 2014. 229 When the parties were unable to reach
agreement, 230 the State requested another two-year extension to reduce
the prison population; 231 the plaintiffs’ opposed the request. 232

225. Id. Any money in the Recidivism Reduction fund may be transferred to the State
Community Corrections Performance Incentives Fund, which provides money to counties to
incentivize them to send fewer people to state prison. Id.
226. S.B. 105, supra note 11; CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 19050.2, 19050.8; CAL. PENAL
CODE. §§ 1233.1, 1233.3, 1233.4, 1233.9, 2910, 2915, 6250.2, 11191, 13602; 2012 Cal.
Stat. § 15, ch. 42 (Cal. 2013).
227. Brown v. Plata, 134 S. Ct. 1 (2013).
228. See Defendants’ Request for an Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline and
Status Report in Response to June 30, 2011, April 11, 2013, June 20, 2013, and August 9,
2013 Orders at 5, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014), (No. 01-1351)
(“Defendants respectfully request that that Court extend the December 31, 2013 deadline to
reduce the prison population to 137.5% of design capacity by three years to December 31,
2016.”).
229. See Order to Meet and Confer at 2–3, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D.
Cal. 2014) (No. 01-1351) (“It is hereby ordered that the parties shall meet and confer,
beginning immediately, regarding defendants’ pending request. . . . The meet-and-confer
process shall explore how defendants can comply with this Court’s June 20, 2013 Order,
including means and dates by which such compliance can be expedited or accomplished and
how this Court can ensure a durable solution to the prison crowding problem.”).
230. See Order to File Proposed Orders Re: Defendants’ Request to Extend Population
Reduction Deadline at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 011351) (“This Court has repeatedly extended the meet-and-confer process, and by virtue
thereof the date for the State’s compliance, in hopes that the parties could reach agreement
on how this Court can best ensure a durable solution to the prison population problem . . . It
now appears that no such agreement will be reached.”).
231. See Defendants’ Amended Application and [Proposed] Order Granting Defendants’
Request for an Extension of April 18, 2004 Deadline at 3, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d
1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014), (No. 01-1351); Defendants’ Order Granting Defendants’ Request for
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The Three–Judge Court Gets Serious: New Enforcement
Mechanisms, a Compliance Monitor, and No Further State
Appeals

On February 10, 2014 the three-judge court issued an order
granting the State’s request for a two-year extension to meet the 137.5
percent cap. 233 The new order requires the State to reduce the prison
population in three stages, or “benchmarks:” June 30, 2014, February
28, 2015, and finally February 28, 2016. 234
For the first time the order provides for the appointment of a
Compliance Officer who will monitor whether the State meets these
benchmarks. 235 If the State fails to successfully meet a benchmark
within thirty days of its expiration, the Compliance Officer will direct
the release of the number of inmates necessary to bring the State into
compliance with the mandated population reduction level. 236
Furthermore, in exchange for the two-year extension, the State has
agreed that it will not appeal the order granting the extension,
subsequent related orders, or any order issued by the Compliance
Officer. 237
an Extension of April 18, 2004 Deadline at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D.
Cal. 2014) (No. 01-1351).
232. See Objections to Defendants’ Jan. 23, 2014 Proposed Order Re Extension of
Crowding Reduction Deadline at 2, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
(No. 01-1351); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order Submitted in Response January 13, 2014 Order at
1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 01-1351).
233. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension
of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2.
234. Id. (the state must reduce the population to 143 percent of design capacity by June
30, 2014, 141.5 percent of design capacity by February 28, 2015, and 137.5 percent design
capacity by February 28, 2016).
235. Id. at 4; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’
Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3. Consistent with
the role of this new Compliance Officer, the court made a point in stating that the release of
prisoners may not impair public safety: “Since 2009, more and more states have come to
recognize that, properly handled, the release of prisoners held past the time necessary to
serve the purposes of their incarceration will not result in danger to the community, but
rather may actually benefit both the prisoners and their communities.” Opinion Re: Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31,
2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2. On April 9, 2014, the three-judge court appointed
Elwood Lui, a former associate justice of the California Court of Appeal, as the new
Compliance Officer. See Order Appointing Compliance Officer at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F.
Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014), (No. 01-1351); Sam Stanton, Judges Appoint Prison
Population Oversight Chief, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 23, 2014, available at
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/04/09/6311041/judges-appoint-prison-population.html.
236. Id.
237. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of
December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3–4 (“[D]efendants have represented to this
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The order stated that in order to meet these benchmarks, the State
agreed to develop “comprehensive and sustainable prison populationreduction reforms, including considering the establishment of a
commission to recommend reforms of state penal and sentencing
laws.” 238 The State also agreed to immediately implement the
following population reduction measures:
(a) Prospectively increase good-time credits for non-violent
second-strike offenders to 33 percent and minimum
custody prisoners to two-for-one;
(b) Implement a new parole determination process making
second-strikers eligible for parole after serving 50 percent
of their sentence;
(c) Parole inmates who have already been granted parole but
have future parole dates;
(d) Expand parole for medically infirm prisoners;
(e) Expand parole for elderly inmates who are sixty years of
age or older and have served a minimum of twenty-five
years of their sentence;
(f) Activate new reentry hubs at thirteen designated prisons;
(g) Pursue the expansion of county-level reentry programs;
(h) Expand the alternative custody program for female
prisoners. 239

Court that, if a two year extension is granted, they will not appeal or support an appeal of the
order granting the extension, or of any of its provisions; nor will they appeal or support the
appeal of any subsequent order necessary to implement the extension order or any of its
provisions, nor any order issued by the Compliance Officer pursuant to the authority vested
in him by the extension order; nor will they move or support a motion to terminate any relief
provided for or extended by the extension order or any of its provisions until at least two
years after the date of the extension order and such time as it is firmly established that
compliance with the 137.5% design capacity benchmark is durable.”).
238. Id. at 3.
239. Id.; see Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for
Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3 (“Defendants shall also
immediately implement the following measures: (a). . . Non-violent second-strikers will be
eligible to earn good time credits at 33.3% and will be eligible to earn milestone credits for
completing rehabilitative programs. Minimum custody inmates will be eligible to earn 2-for1 good time credits to the extent such credits do not deplete participation in fire camps . . . ;
(b) Create and implement a new parole determination process through which non-violent
second-strikers will be eligible for parole consideration by the Board of Parole Hearings
once they have served 50% of their sentence; (c) Parole certain inmates serving
indeterminate sentences who have already been granted parole by the Board of Parole
Hearings but have future parole dates; (d) In consultation with the Receiver’s office, finalize
and implement an expanded parole process for medically incapacitated inmates; (e) Finalize
and implement a new parole process whereby inmates who are 60 years of age or older and
have served a minimum of twenty-five years of their sentence will be referred to the Board
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In addition, despite the authorization granted under SB 105, the
order prohibits the State from increasing the population of out-of-state
prisoners above the current level of approximately 8,900 prisoners. 240
This means that prisoners may still be transferred to other states to
replace other out-of-state prisoners who are released or returned to
California, but the total number of California prisoners housed in outof-state prisons shall not increase.
Though many of these new population reduction measures
announced in the February 2014 order focus on reducing the number of
prisoners, 241 the State is also still very obviously focused on increasing
capacity wherever it can, as evinced by the new funding and
authorizations contained in SB 105, 242 discussed above. In a March
2014 status report, the State informed the three-judge panel that its
prison population was about 502 inmates above the upcoming June 30
benchmark. 243 The State indicated that it anticipated getting below the
143 percent mark before the deadline by utilizing some of the contract
prison cells SB 105 authorized. 244
In its February 2014 order, the three-judge court appeared
optimistic that the State “belated as it may be” is ready to move toward
a durable solution to the prison overcrowding crisis.245 In addition, the
language used by the three-judge court is more forceful than in any
previous order in the case:
We recognize that these measures should have been adopted much
earlier, that plaintiffs’ lawyers have made unceasing efforts to
obtain immediate relief on behalf of their clients, and that
California prisoners deserve far better treatment than they have
received from defendants over the past four and a half years.

of Parole Hearings to determine suitability for parole; (f) Activate new reentry hubs at a
total of 13 designated prisons to be operational within one year from the date of this order;
(g) Pursue expansion of pilot reentry programs with additional counties and local
communities; and (h) Implement an expanded alternative custody program for female
inmates.”).
240. Id. at 2.
241. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension
of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra
note 20.
242. See S.B. 105, supra note 11.
243. Status Report at Exhibit B at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal.
2014) (No. 01-1351), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-March2014/March-2014-Status-Report.pdf.
244. Id.
245. Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for
Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3.
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Similarly, California’s citizens have incurred far greater costs, both
financial and otherwise, as a result of defendants’ heretofore
unyielding resistance to compliance with this Court’s orders.
Finally, we recognize that this Court must also accept part of the
blame for not acting more forcefully with regard to defendants’
obduracy in the face of its continuing constitutional violations.
Nevertheless, resolving the conditions in California prisons for the
long run, and not merely for the next few months, is of paramount
importance to this Court as well as to the people of this State. 246

C. The State’s Continued Stinginess with Rehabilitative Credits
As noted above, in exchange for the two-year extension to comply
with the population cap, the State agreed to file no further appeals,
develop “comprehensive and sustainable prison population-reduction
reforms,” and implement immediate population reduction measures,
including, prospectively increasing good-time credits for non-violent,
second-strike and minimum custody prisoners. 247 This change, along
with other increases to prisoners’ credit-earning potential, could
significantly decrease the length of stay for non-violent felonies. For
instance, the Legislature could increase the total number of weeks of
credit a prisoner can earn for participation in programs. In 2009, the
Legislature allowed the CDCR to grant six weeks of credit per year
prisoner for every program completed. 248 While the granting of such
credits is consistent with the practices of other states and the
recommendations given to the CDCR and the Legislature by a panel of
corrections experts, the amount of credits awarded is far lower than the
three-to-twelve months of credit allowed by most states and the fourto-six months recommended by an expert panel appointed by CDCR. 249
246. Id. at 4.
247. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of
December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2-3; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra
note 20, at 3.
248. See S.B. 18, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE §
2933.05.
249. In response to the California Budget Act of 2006-2007, the CDCR created a panel
of nationally recognized corrections experts to: (1) complete an assessment of California’s
adult prison and parole programs designed to reduce recidivism and (2) provide
recommendations for improving programming in California’s prison and parole system. In
addition, the expert panel offered suggestion on how the CDCR could meet the benchmarks
established by AB 900, the Public Safety and Offender Rehabilitation Services Act of 2007.
See A ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVE OFFENDER PROGRAMMING IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. DEP’T
OF CORRS. & REHABILITATION 12, 92–93 (Jun. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/Press_Release_Archive/2007_Press_Releases/Press20070629
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The State could not only expand program credits for eligible prisoners,
but could also grant more prisoners the opportunity to participate in
credit-eligible programming. In addition, the State could apply the
expanded credits retroactively to prisoners who have already completed
programs. This would have an immediate, significant, and ongoing
impact on the prison population numbers.
In light of the limited program resources available in CDCR
facilities, 250 the State could also provide credits to low risk prisoners
who maintain a good conduct record and maintain a work assignment if
one is available, even if they do not complete eligible programs. As the
expert panel’s report pointed out, requiring low risk prisoners to
participate in unnecessary rehabilitative programs can increase their
recidivism rates. 251 It would therefore improve public safety to provide
low risk prisoners with additional credits for good behavior, rather than
requiring counter-productive program completion. Such a reform
would also free space in rehabilitative programs for those prisoners
who are more likely to benefit.
Expanding and refining the use of rehabilitative programming
credits can be an important tool to regulate the prison population and
encourage prisoners to participate in meaningful risk reduction
programs. 252 In pleadings submitted in the Plata litigation, the State
identified several categories of reforms that would further reduce the
137.5 percent cap. 253 These include the extension of some good time
.html [hereinafter ROADMAP].
250. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORRS. & REHABILITATION, THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA
CORRECTIONS: A BLUEPRINT TO SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, END FEDERAL COURT
OVERSIGHT, AND IMPROVE THE PRISON SYSTEM 21 (April 23, 2012) Appendix, available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf.
251. See ROADMAP, supra note 249, at 23.
252. Risk reduction programs are “intended to reduce risk factors associated with
antisocial behavior of offenders, and thus make them less likely to commit further criminal
offenses. . . . Risk reduction programs are those programs that would be judged successful,
or not, based on their impact on recidivism by participants.” JESSE JANNETTA, CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAM
INVENTORY 2 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at
http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/CDCR%20Recidivism%20Reduction%20Program
%20Inventory.pdf.
253. See Amended Defendants’ Response to April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List of
Proposed Population Reduction Measures; Court-Ordered Plan, supra note 209; Defendants’
Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to Achieve Required Prison
Population Reduction at 8, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 011351). See also California Files Court-Ordered Prison Plan, Vows Supreme Court Appeal,
CDCR TODAY (May 2, 2013), http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2013/05/california-files-courtordered-prison.html (quoting CDCR Secretary Jeff Beard’s statement that the State’s
population reduction plan was submitted under protest).
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credits that the state was ordered to implement by the three-judge
court. 254 According to its own estimates, the State could reduce the
prison population by 1,578 persons if it expanded the rate at which
prisoners could earn credits and the populations of prisoners eligible to
earn credits. 255 However, the State has not implemented the two-forone credit-earning reforms for minimum security prisoners that are
mandated by the three-judge court.256

V.

BEYOND REALIGNMENT: SHIFTING THE PARADIGM WILL
REQUIRE SENTENCING REFORM TO REDUCE THE NUMBER
OF NON-SERIOUS, NON-VIOLENT OFFENSES PUNISHED AS
FELONIES, AND THE LENGTH OF SENTENCES IMPOSED FOR
THEM

Realignment does not adequately address a fundamental cause of
the prison overcrowding crisis: California’s excessive sentences,
especially for non-serious, non-violent crimes. Realignment did not
change the length of sentences that can be imposed for the “realigned”
offenses, the applicability of sentencing enhancements, or the fact that
these offenses remain felonies. Even under Realignment, anyone
previously convicted of a serious or violent felony, no matter how long
ago, will still be sent to prison, not jail, when sentenced to a period of
incarceration for any new felony, no matter how minor. Under
California’s harsh three strikes laws, the “realigned” non-serious and

254. Amended Defendants’ Response to April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List of
Proposed Population Reduction Measures; Court-Ordered Plan, supra note 209; Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31,
2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2-3; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3.
255. CDCR estimates show that the expansion of “two-for-one” credits to minimum
custody prisoners will reduce the population by 257 individuals. Extending the creditearning cap from six to eight weeks for violent, serious, and second-strike offenders would
reduce the population by an additional 554 prisoners. Furthermore, if the credit-earning
capacity for violent and second-strike felons was increased to thirty-four percent, from their
current caps of fifteen percent and twenty percent respectively, the State estimates that the
prison population will be reduced by 767 prisoners. Id. at 9–11, 22–23.
256. According to the May 15, 2014 Status Report to the three-judge court, the State has
thus far refused to increase the prospective credit earning rates of minimum custody
prisoners to the three-judge court mandated level. See Defendants’ May 2014 Status Report
in Response to February 10, 2014 Order at Exhibit B, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004
(E.D. Cal. 2014), (No. 01-1351) (“With respect to two-for-one credit earning for minimum
custody inmates, the State continues to evaluate this population reduction tool in light of fire
camp participation rates.”).
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non-violent felonies can still trigger long prison sentences.257
Moreover, the Legislature purposefully excluded fifty-nine nonserious, non-violent crimes the Brown Administration originally
proposed to realign; many continue serving sentences for these crimes
in state prison. 258 Even those sent to jail instead of prison under
Realignment are still subject to the same excessive sentences and
enhancements as existed before Realignment, which can result in
sentences of ten years or more served in jails never designed to house
prisoners for such extended periods of incarceration, raising serious
constitutional concerns and further exacerbating overcrowding in
county jails. 259
The State’s acknowledgement that Realignment alone can never
sufficiently reduce the prison population, 260 in conjunction with the
extraordinary new Plata enforcement mechanisms, 261 could provide
unprecedented impetus for sentencing reform. The Compliance
Monitor can order prisoners released early if the population

257. Even after the enactment of the 2012 Prop. 36 ballot initiative, the second-strike
provision of the Three Strikes law still requires double length sentences for defendants
convicted of any new felony, who have one prior serious or violent felony conviction. See
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(1), (e)(1); infra Section V.A.1.
258. See SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21, at 14. The Report states
that concerns from law enforcement were a significant factor in the legislature not realigning
these crimes. Id.; see also AB 109 Crime Exclusions List, supra note 15 (listing crimes that
are not defined in the Penal Code as serious or violent offenses, yet still must be served in
state prison, rather than in local custody, after the implementation of Realignment).
259. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (enhancement adding to sentences for new
offenses based on prior convictions resulting in prison sentences); CAL. PENAL CODE §
11370.4 (enhancements adding to sentences for controlled substance offenses based upon
weight of controlled substance involved in offense). These are but two examples of many.
According to a 2007 report from the Little Hoover Commission, “Today, there are more
than 1,000 felony sentencing laws and more than 100 felony sentence enhancements across
21 separate sections of California law.” LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at 34. See
also JOAN PETERSILIA, ET. AL., VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 90, at 120 (“Realigned
felonies carry longer sentences than misdemeanors and are subject to enhancements that
may add up to sentences of a decade or more. In Los Angeles County one inmate has been
sentenced to 42 years in county jail
. . . . The longest jail sentence imposed in Riverside County to date is 12 years and two
months.”).
260. See, e.g., Defendant’s Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to
Achieve Required Prison Population Reduction, supra note 25 at 1; Defendant’s Motion to
Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 5, at 1. See also Three-Judge
Court Updates, supra note 25; See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’
Statement in Response to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra
note 18, at 2.
261. Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for
Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3.
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benchmarks are not met on time, 262 a result the State is highly
motivated to avoid.
On the other hand, the state coffers are in much better shape now
than in 2011. 263 As SB 105 demonstrates, the state now has money and
a willingness to spend it to increase prison capacity. 264 The fight
between Senate Democrats and Governor Brown over AB 84 and SB
105 was in essence about choices for how to comply with Plata: AB 84
focused more on providing new funding to further Realignment’s
stated intent to rehabilitate rather than punish for non-violent, nonserious offenses, thereby reducing recidivism and the number of people
being sent to prison. 265 The Governor’s plan focused more on building
additional capacity so the State can decrease the prison population to
137.5 percent of design capacity without significantly further reducing
the numbers of prisoners. 266 SB 105 represents a compromise between
these different approaches; 267 those seeking to increase capacity appear
to have gotten the better end of the deal.
Almost entirely absent from the SB 105 debate, however, was
any discussion about broader sentencing reforms. 268 A largely
overlooked provision of AB 84 would have established the California
Public Safety Commission, a permanent, advisory state government
agency. 269 The Commission would have been tasked with providing
information and developing recommendations for the Legislature and
the Governor,
to assist with prison population management options consistent
with public safety, to assist with effective correctional practices and
the effective allocation of public safety resources, to develop
recommendations for the Legislature and the Governor to consider
regarding criminal sentences and evidence-based programming for
criminal offenders, and to develop recommendations for the
270
Legislature and the Governor to consider sentencing credits.

262. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension
of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part
and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline,
supra note 20, at 3.
263. See, e.g., LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET, supra note 218.
264. See S.B. 105, supra note 11.
265. A.B. 84, supra note 221.
266. S.B. 105, supra note 11 (introduced Aug. 27, 2013).
267. S.B. 105, supra note 11 (approved by the Governor Sept. 12, 2013).
268. Id.
269. A.B. 84, supra note 221.
270. Id. (emphasis added).
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This language was consistent with the statement in the Plata threejudge court’s February 2014 order that, among the steps the State had
agreed to take was, “considering the establishment of a commission to
recommend reforms of state penal and sentencing laws.” 271 Similarly,
when Governor Brown vetoed a bill in late 2013 that would have
reduced low-level drug possession offenses to wobblers instead of
felonies, his veto message stated,
Under SB 105, we are going to examine in detail California's
criminal justice system, including the current sentencing structure.
We will do so with the full participation of all necessary parties,
including law enforcement, local government, courts and treatment
providers. That will be the appropriate time to evaluate our existing
drug laws. 272

SB 105, however, contains no provision requiring the state to,
“examine in detail California's criminal justice system, including the
current sentencing structure.” Quite the contrary, SB 105 eliminated
the sentencing commission that would have been created under SB
84. 273 Instead, according to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for SB
105, it requires “the administration to assess the state prison system,
including capacity needs, prison population levels, recidivism rates,
and factors effecting crime levels, and to develop recommendations on
balanced solutions that are cost effective and protect public safety.” 274
SB 105 says nothing explicit about a sentencing commission or
sentencing reform. 275 The bill did, however, require the DOF to submit
the administration’s interim report about SB 105 implementation to the
Legislature by April 1, 2014, and to submit a final report to the
Legislature not later than January 10, 2015. 276 The first Interim Report
reveals much about the Brown Administration’s priorities when it
comes to implementing SB 105 and complying with Plata. 277 The only
mention of sentencing reform in this report—which largely focuses on
descriptions of the prison population and efforts underway to increase
prison capacity 278—occurs near the end, in a long list of items
271. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of
December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3.
272. Veto Message for S.B. 649, infra note 361 (emphasis added); see further discussion
of SB 649 in Section V.B.1.c., infra.
273. S.B. 105, supra note 11; A.B. 84, supra note 221.
274. S.B. 105, supra note 11.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21.
278. Id. at 19 (the report provides the following details about steps taken and planned to

HOPPER FINAL

588

8/21/2014 4:04 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 54

suggested by various stakeholders the DOF interviewed for the
report. 279 This list is characterized as, “topics that require further
discussion.” 280 The interviewed stakeholders suggested several
sentencing reform-related topics, including: review the current felony
sentencing structure; examine the statewide variation in the use of split
sentences; determine the impact of stacking terms during sentencing;
examine the impact of second-strike sentences on the prison
population; review existing drug laws and retroactive changes to drug
laws; and review the number of offenders in prison for non-violent and
drug crimes. 281 In the Section immediately following entitled, “Efforts
Currently Underway,” the report says only that, “The Legislature and
Governor have already begun addressing some of these issues and the
Administration has several proposals before the Legislature that are
consistent with some of the topics raised.” 282
In other words, neither the Governor nor the Legislature has yet
taken any concrete steps to consider, much less enact, substantive
sentencing reform to reduce any penalties or sentence lengths. Indeed,
there are serious discussions underway in Sacramento to roll back
Realignment by creating new exemptions to send more people to state
prison.283 As noted earlier, even those sent to jail instead of prison for
non-serious, non-violent offenses are still subject to the same excessive
sentences and enhancements as existed before Realignment, which can
result in sentences of ten years or more served in jails. 284 In 2012, State
Senator Bill Emerson, in collaboration with District Attorney Paul
Zellerbach of Riverside County introduced legislation to require all
increase capacity: “The state’s current design capacity is for 81,574 inmates. The activation
of the DeWitt Nelson Correctional Annex in the spring of 2014 will add 1,133 beds,
increasing the capacity to 82,707. An additional 2,376 beds will be activated in early 2016,
when the three dormitory infill projects are complete at Mule Creek State Prison and
Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, increasing the capacity to 85,083. The
Department has 4,480 fire camp beds that are not included in the prison capacity noted
above. Applying the court‑imposed population cap of 137.5 percent of design capacity will
allow the state to house 116,989 inmates in its prisons in February 2016. The Department’s
total adult inmate population as of March 12, 2014, was 134,801, of which 117,153 were
housed in the Department’s adult institutions, and the remaining 17,648 were housed in fire
camps or contract beds.”).
279. Id. at 27–29.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 28.
282. Id. at 29.
283. S.B. 1441, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); see also, e.g., A.B. 601, 2013–
2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (introduced Feb. 10, 2014); A.B. 2590, 2013–14 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (introduced Feb. 21, 2014).
284. See supra note 259; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h) (West 2014).
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sentences of three years or more to be served in state prison rather than
county jail. 285 The bill failed but Zellerbach is determined to
reintroduce it. 286 Others have proposed similar legislation to send those
sentenced to long terms–because of weight-based enhancements for
drug crimes–to state prison instead of jail.287 Governor Brown has also
recently suggested amending Realignment to allow persons with these
long sentences to once again be sent to prison instead of jail. 288 No one
appears to be asking the obvious question: Why are we incarcerating
people for such lengthy periods for non-serious, non-violent offenses,
especially people who have never committed a violent or serious
offense? Only such persons can be sent jail instead of prison under
current Realignment law, since anyone with any prior conviction for a
serious or violent felony is not eligible for a jail sentence instead of
state prison. 289
In October 2012 the State bluntly told the Plata three-judge court
that the 137.5 percent cap “cannot be achieved unless the Court alters
state law.” 290 This statement is only half true. State sentencing laws
must be changed. But the State’s assertion that only the federal courts
have the power to do so is false. The Legislature and the Governor can
enact legislation to reform California sentencing laws, including
reducing the penalties for low-level, non-violent drug and property

285. S.B. 1441, supra note 283.
286. JOAN PETERSILIA, ET. AL., VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 90, at 120.
287. Id. (“Assistant District Attorney Karen Meredith of Alameda County also advocates
legislation to limit jail sentences, but suggests doing so by diverting drug offenders subject
to weight clause enhancements to prison, citing this group as a major source of excessive jail
terms.”).
288. Don Thompson, Counties tell Gov. Brown They Need Money for Jail Realignment,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Apr.
19,
2014,
available
at
http://www.scpr.org/news/2014/04/19/43615/counties-tell-gov-brown-they-need-money-forjail-r/ (“In Kern County, Sheriff Donny Youngblood worries that county jails built to hold
criminals for no more than a year are now housing inmates for a decade or more. Brown has
proposed modifying his realignment law so that inmates sentenced to more than 10 years
would again serve their time in state prisons, but Youngblood thinks the sentence length
should be shorter. ‘Three years, from my standpoint, might be reasonable,’ he said.”).
289. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(3) (West, 2014).
290. See Defendant’s Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to Achieve
Required Prison Population Reduction, supra note 25, at 1–2 ; Defendant’s Motion to
Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 5, at 2. See also Three-Judge
Court
Updates,
CAL.
DEP’T
OF
CORR.
&
REHAB.,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/3_judge_panel_decision.html (compiling updated figures).
This stark admission that Realignment alone is not sufficient to meet the court’s population
cap requirement confirmed what the plaintiffs’ experts had already known to be true. See
Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to October 11,
2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18, at 2.
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crimes. In the following Section, we propose specific reforms and
describe the dramatic impact they would have on prison and jail
populations.
A. Specific Sentencing Reform Proposals
1. The Legislature or the Voters Could Extend Proposition 36–
Like Reforms to Second-Strikers
The stated intent of California’s 1994 Three Strikes laws was the
assurance of “longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those
who commit a felony and have previously been convicted of serious
and/or violent felony offenses.” 291 This goal is achieved primarily
through long mandatory sentences for those with prior serious felony
convictions when convicted of any new felony. Individuals convicted
of any new felony with two or more prior “serious”292 or violent felony
convictions, were sentenced to an indeterminate term of life
imprisonment with a minimum term calculated as the greater of: three
times the usual sentence; twenty-five years; or the term pursuant to
California Penal Code § 1170, including any applicable sentencing
enhancements. 293 The triggering offense could be any felony, including
simple drug possession or petty theft. 294 Admissible prior offenses
included out-of-state felonies 295 and juvenile convictions. 296 There was,
moreover, no requirement that the previous offense be one for which

291. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b), 1170.12.
292. “Serious” felonies range anywhere from purse-snatching to murder under the
definition provided in the California Penal Code. Id. § 1192.7(c).
293. Id. § 667(e)(2)(A).
294. There are vast examples of minor triggering offenses. See, e.g., Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (stealing golf clubs); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63
(2003) (shoplifting 5 video tapes).
295. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 12, § 1 (AB 971) (the “Three Strikes” legislation that
enacted CAL. PENAL CODE § 667); Proposition 184. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 8, 1994) (the original “Three Strikes” ballot initiative). See also
People v. Warner, 139 P.3d 475 (Cal. 2006) (prosecution must prove that the out-of-state
offense contains all the elements to qualify as serious or violent in California); People v.
Hazelton, 926 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1996) (holding that the same applies for Section 1170.12).
296. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 12, § 1 (AB 971); Proposition 184. CALIFORNIA BALLOT
PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 8, 1994). To be counted as a strike, the statute
requires that the offender had been 16 or older at the time of the juvenile offense; that the
offense is listed under Section 707(b) of the Welfare Institutions Code; that the offender had
been found fit and proper under the juvenile court law; and that the offender was adjudicated
a ward of the juvenile court. The use of prior juvenile convictions has been upheld for threestrike purposes even though juvenile adjudications do not afford the defendant a jury trial.
People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (Cal. 2009).
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the defendant had served a sentence in a state prison. 297
In November 2012, voters in California—by a two-to-one
margin—passed Proposition 36, the “Three Strikes Reform Act of
2012,” which revises the state’s 1994 Three Strikes scheme. 298
Proposition 36 precludes minor, non-violent crimes—like drug
possession or low-level property crimes—from counting as third strikes
and triggering life sentences. 299 Proposition 36 does nothing, however,
to address the much larger population of second strikers who are also
serving disproportionate sentences for non-serious, non-violent
triggering offenses. 300 The original Three Strikes law mandates that
defendants convicted of any new felony, with one prior serious or
violent felony conviction, 301 must receive a sentence twice that for the
usual felony conviction. 302
According to the April 1, 2014 S.B. 105 DOF Interim report to the
Legislature, as of June 2013, there were a total of 34,699 offenders
serving a second‑ strike sentence in state prison. 303 Of that total,
14,460 inmates were serving sentences for non-serious, non-violent,
and non-sex offenses, with the two of the three most common
controlling offenses being Possession of a Controlled Substance
(1,817) and Possession of a Controlled Substance for Sale (1,698). 304
The DOF report also notes that, since Realignment went into effect,
some counties are now sending significantly more people to state
prison on second-strike sentences than before. 305 In the eight months
prior to Realignment, total second strike admissions were 5,026, while

297. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 12, § 1 (AB 971); Proposition 184. CALIFORNIA BALLOT
PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 8, 1994).
298. Prop. 36, supra note 67. Prior to Proposition 36, a third strike offense did not need
to be serious or violent, and, instead, could be any felony including simple drug possession
or petty theft. Now, as modified by Proposition 36, only violent felonies count as a third
strike, under which a 25-years-to-life sentence may be imposed. CAL. PENAL CODE §§
667(e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(ii). See also David Mills & Michael Romano, The
Passage and Implementation of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), 25
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 265 (2013).
299. See Prop. 36, supra note 67; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(2)(A)(ii),
1170.12(c)(2)(A)(ii).
300. Id.
301. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (defining these felonies). Prior convictions for
these purposes are violent felonies defined under § 667.5(c) or serious felonies defined
under § 1192.7(c). These offenses include: murder, mayhem, various sexual crimes, arson,
kidnapping, robbery, etc.
302. Id. § 667(e)(1).
303. SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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second strike admissions were 6,059 during an eight month period two
years later, representing a 20 percent increase. 306 Among the more
significant second strike admission increases were a 55 percent
increase for Possession of a Controlled Substance. 307
Reforming the second-strike provision in a manner similar to the
third-strike reforms of Proposition 36 would require either a two-thirds
majority vote of both houses of the Legislature or another voter
initiative. 308 For the first time since 1883, California democrats have a
super majority in both houses and could, theoretically, change the
Three Strikes law. 309 However, it appears extremely unlikely they will
do so given, as discussed below, the Legislature’s rejection of other
much more modest sentencing reforms. 310
2. The Governor and Attorney General Could Expedite and
Assist Review of Current Prisoners’ Cases Eligible for
Retroactive Application of Proposition 36
Proposition 36 also includes a limited retroactive resentencing
provision that allows any already-sentenced prisoner serving an
indeterminate life sentence for a non-serious, non-violent third-strike to

306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(j), 1170.12(g). A critically important aspect of the
Three Strikes ballot initiative for our purposes is its specific provision (section 4) that allows
it to be amended or repealed only by a two-thirds legislative supermajority or another voter
initiative. See Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 1, 9 (1998).
309. See Senators, CAL. STATE SEN., http://senate.ca.gov/senators; MEMBERS, CAL.
STATE ASSEMB. http://assembly.ca.gov/assemblymembers. See also Rick Orlov and Andrew
Edwards, California’s Democratic Supermajority Promises Not to Abuse New Power, LA
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/04/californiademocratic-supermajority_n_2237991.html.
310. As the time this article was submitted for publication, a new sentencing reform
ballot initiative had been issued a title and summary by the Attorney General for circulation
to gather signatures to qualify for inclusion in the 2014 election. See Initiatives and
Referenda Cleared for Circulation, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/cleared-for-circulation.htm (showing that
initiative 13-0060: “Criminal Sentences. Misdemeanor Penalties. Initiative Statute” received
title and summary from the Attorney General and was cleared for circulation). The
proponents are San Francisco District Attorney and former Police Chief George Gascon and
former San Diego Police Chief William Lansdowne. Id. The initiative would reduce the
felonies and wobblers discussed above, as well as some others, to misdemeanors for most
defendants, excluding only those defendants with specified serious prior felonies. Id. In
addition, the legislative analyst found that the fiscal impact would result in criminal justice
savings in the low hundreds of millions of dollars annually at both the state and county
levels. Id.
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petition for a recall of his or her sentence.311 The original sentencing
court will conduct a hearing to determine whether to retroactively
impose a new sentence consistent with the prospective sentencing rules
created by Proposition 36. 312
Under this retroactive resentencing provision, currently
incarcerated eligible third-strikers are entitled to file petitions within
two years of the implementation of Proposition 36. 313 As of April 2014,
1,613 prisoners had been released from custody under Proposition
36. 314 Approximately 1,500 additional prisoners were eligible for relief
under Proposition 36 and waiting to have their cases reviewed in
county courts. 315 In Los Angeles County alone, 651 cases of inmates
eligible for relief under Proposition 36 had yet to be processed.316
Prisoners released under Prop. 36 have thus far demonstrated they pose
little threat to public safety. According to a report from Stanford
University, “CDCR data shows that the recidivism rate of prisoners
released under Proposition 36 is 1.3 percent. By comparison, the
recidivism rate of all other inmates released from prison over the same
period of time is over 30 percent. … Those released pursuant to
Proposition 36 have a better recidivism rate than any other comparable
cohort of prisoners released from CDCR custody.” 317 The same report
found that Proposition 36 has already saved California over $30 million
dollars in prison costs, and is likely to save taxpayers over $750 million
over the next ten years. 318 Facilitated implementation of Proposition
36’s retroactivity provision could expedite the release of eligible
prisoners. This could be achieved by, for instance, having the Attorney
General’s office review the relevant files and recommend release even
311. Prop. 36, supra note 67, § 6; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.126.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See Proposition 36 Progress Report: Over 1,500 Prisoners Released, Historically
Low Recidivism Rate, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL THREE STRIKES PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL
DEFENSE
AND
EDUCATION
FUND
(Apr.
2014),
available
at
http://www.threestrikesproject.org.
315. See id. at 3.
316. See id. at 1. Prisoners released under Prop. 36 have thus far demonstrated they pose
little threat to public safety. According to a report from Stanford University, “The
recidivism rate of prisoners released under Proposition 36 to date is well below state and
national averages. Fewer than 2 percent of the prisoners released under Proposition 36 have
been charged with new crimes, according to state and county records. By comparison, the
average recidivism rate over a similar time period for non-Proposition 36 inmates leaving
California prisons is 16 percent. Nationwide, 30 percent of inmates released from state
prisons are arrested for a new crime within six months of release.” Id. at 1–2.
317. Id. at 1–2.
318. Id. at 3.
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in the absence of, or prior to filing of, a petition from the prisoner. 319
Of course, the Governor could also order these prisoners released under
his constitutional power to commute sentences. 320

319. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to
October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18.
320. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.
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Table 2. Primary Offense Sentenced Under the 2 and 3
Strikes Law as of August 2011 CDCR Prison Population
Source: CDCR

Crime
Totals
Violence
Homicide
Robbery
Assault & battery
Rape/sex crime
Other Crimes
Person
Property
Burglary
Larceny
PT w/ priors
Other property
Drugs
Drug Sale/
Manufacture
Drug Possession
Other Crimes
Weapons
Neglect children
MV-Fleeing
Accident
Bigamy/incest
Sex offenderregistration
DUI
Obscene matter
Indecent
exposure
Crime against
dependent adult
Crime against
public peace

2nd Striker
3rd Striker
Prisoners
%
Prisoners
%
28,384 100%
8,576 100%
10,783
38%
2,996
35%
986
3%
133
2%
5,589
20%
2,004
23%
3,401
12%
609
7%
412
1%
161
2%
395
6,838
3,602
906
883
1,447
4,773

1%
24%
13%
3%
3%
5%
17%

89
2,585
1,481
338
363
403
1,271

1%
30%
17%
4%
4%
5%
15%

2,092
2,681
5,990
1,225
1,162

7%
9%
21%
4%
4%

368
903
1,724
429
176

4%
11%
20%
5%
2%

1,022
1,012

4%
4%

393
363

5%
4%

409
279
19

1%
1%
0%

139
53
5

2%
1%
0%

28

0%

25

0%

72

0%

4

0%

17

0%

9

0%
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Threat to
government
Criminal threats

139
606

0%
2%

[Vol: 54

25
103

0%
1%

3. The Legislature Could Reclassify Some Non-Serious, NonViolent Wobblers and Felonies as Misdemeanors
As noted above, reforming the second-strike provision of the
original Three Strikes law would require either a two-thirds majority
vote of both houses of the Legislature or another voter initiative. 321
However, the Legislature could reduce some felony and wobbler
crimes to misdemeanors by simple majority vote. This would
significantly reduce the second-strike prison population and reduce
local jail populations.
As noted above, once a person has suffered one conviction for a
serious or violent felony, any new felony conviction, even if not
serious or violent, triggers a double-length sentence (second-strike).322
Historically, many of California’s long second- and third-strike
sentences are triggered by felony convictions for minor low-level drug
or property crimes that are either currently punishable as felonies or as
“wobblers”—crimes which prosecutors have discretion to charge either
as a felony or as a misdemeanor. 323 Examples of wobblers that can lead
to a felony conviction and trigger an increased sentence are simple
possession of amphetamines, methamphetamine or hashish, some types
of forgery, 324 vandalism, 325 writing bad checks, 326 some minor theft
crimes, 327 and many other non-serious, non-violent crimes. 328

321. See supra note 277; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(j), 1170.12(g).
322. See supra note 277; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(1), 1170.12(c)(1).
323. See supra Table 2.
324. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 470, 473.
325. Id. § 594(b)(1).
326. Id. § 476a(a).
327. See, e.g., id. §§ 487, 666 (defining grand theft). Section 487b may also be
considered a minor theft crime, though it is punishable only as a felony. The offense has a
low threshold: the conversion of real property $250 or more in value.
328. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a) (West 2007); CAL. PENAL CODE §§
470, 473, 476a(a), 487, 594(b)(1) 666. Other non-serious, non-violent wobblers include
California Penal Code Section 460 (burglary in the second degree, or commercial burglary),
California Vehicle Code Section 10851(a) (vehicle theft), and California Penal Code Section
470b (possession of forged driver’s license or identification card). Although the offenses
under California Penal Code Section 1320(b) (willful failure to appear in connection with a
felony after release on own recognizance) and Section 1320.5 (willful failure to appear in
connection with a felony after release on bail) are codified as felonies, both are punishable
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If the Legislature reduced any of the non-serious, non-violent
offenses that have historically triggered lengthy second- or third-strike
sentences to misdemeanors, those convictions would no longer invoke
the second-strike provision of the Three Strikes law, 329 thereby
reducing the prison population. In 2013, there were a total of 34,699
serving a second-strike sentence in California state prisons, of which
14,460 had triggering felonies that were non-serious, non-violent, and
non-sex offenses. 330
It is worth noting that even the federal government charges simple
possession of controlled substances as a misdemeanor, not a felony. 331
Moreover, the federal Department of Justice has acknowledged the
problems associated with long sentences for petty drug crimes and has
recently taken steps to reduce mandatory minimums and otherwise
lessen some of the long prison terms these offenses. 332 Similarly, the
California Legislature has acknowledged that the wobblers are
relatively minor crimes not worthy of felony status and state prison
sentences. Wobblers can be charged as misdemeanors, subject to the
discretion of the prosecutor. 333 Moreover, all of these wobblers and
low-level felonies are non-serious, non-violent crimes that the
Legislature has now “realigned,” under AB 109, meaning sentences
will be served in county jails rather than state prison (provided that
defendants have no prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex
offenses).334 It would be a relatively modest additional step for the
Legislature to change the status of these offenses to misdemeanors. 335

by either imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or imprisonment
pursuant to subdivision (h) of California Penal Code Section 1170–the typical sentencing
structure for a wobbler.
329. Since the implementation of Proposition 36, these non-serious, non-violent felonies
no longer trigger the third-strike provision of the law. See supra note 267.
330. See SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
331. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844 (West 2014).
332. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ATTORNEY GENERAL HOLDER
URGES CHANGES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO RESERVE HARSHEST
PENALTIES FOR MOST SERIOUS DRUG TRAFFICKERS (Mar. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/March/14-ag-263.html.
333. See BERWICK, LINDENBERG & ROO, supra note 71, at 4 (defining wobblers as
felonies which may be reduced to a misdemeanor under the discretion of a prosecutor,
judge, or magistrate).
334. See J. Couzens and Bigelow, supra note 15, at 6–8 (listing the non-violent, nonserious felony offenses that are excluded from county jail sentences under Realignment).
335. Public support for such sentencing reform appears to be both broad and intense,
according to public opinion research conducted by Tulchin Research. According to data
from a Tulchin Research survey conducted in May 2012, nearly three-quarters (seventy
percent) of likely California voters support reducing the penalty for simple possession of a
small amount of drug for personal use from a felony to a misdemeanor. Memorandum from
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The impact of this proposed sentencing reform is illustrated by
considering the current number of state prisoners incarcerated for these
low-level, non-serious, non-violent offenses. Over 25 percent of the
state prison population (33,678) is currently serving a prison term for a
non-serious and non-violent crime. 336 Of this total, 11,471 inmates also
do not have a conviction for a prior serious or violent crime (8 percent
of the total prison population). 337
B. Political Obstacles to Reform
The State’s argument, in their Plata briefing, explaining why it is
unacceptable to divert additional prisoners, convicted of drug
possession, from state prison to local jails is telling. Rather than
speaking in terms of statutory or constitutional impediments, the State
said this:
The prison population could be reduced further if additional
felonies, which are currently punishable by state prison (including
drug possession, petty theft, second degree burglary, vehicle theft,
and forgery), were instead treated as punishable by incarceration in
county jail only. Assuming sentencing laws were changed and
made effective after June 2013, the population could be reduced by
228 inmates by December 2013.
This is another poor choice because counties are still working to
implement their additional responsibilities under realignment. If
any changes are implemented that require county jail incarceration,
they should not be imposed by a federal court, but instead
considered by the state Legislature, which can address the various
stakeholders’ concerns and determine whether these changes serve
sound public safety and criminal justice objectives. 338

Perhaps there is some merit to the State’s assertion that sentencing

Tulchin Research to Interested Parties 1 (May 21, 2012), available at
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file19_10808.pdf.
The
pollsters found that “an overwhelming majority of voters support reducing personal drug
possession charges for drugs such as ‘heroin, cocaine or methamphetamine’ from a felony
charge to a misdemeanor charge.” Id. at 3. Moreover, forty-three percent strongly support
the proposal, twenty-seven percent somewhat support, and twenty-seven percent oppose,
with just three percent undecided on the matter. Id. Support for reform is extraordinarily
widespread, encompassing solid majorities of Democrats (seventy-eight percent),
independents (seventy-two percent), and Republicans (fifty-seven percent), as well as
majorities of voters in every corner of the state. Id. at 4.
336. SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21, at 6.
337. Id.
338. Amended Defendants’ Response to April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List of
Proposed Population Reduction Measures, supra note 209, at 8 (emphasis added).
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reforms like these would be more appropriately enacted via the
legislative process than imposed by federal judicial fiat. But the federal
courts have been forced to step in to address the State’s overcrowded
prisons precisely because the political process has repeatedly failed.
In their January 2013 pleadings in the Plata litigation, the State
asserted that further reductions in the prison population necessary to
meet the court-imposed cap were impossible without amending the
state constitution or changing state law. 339 They further argued that no
additional reductions were possible without significantly threatening
public safety:
The further prison population reductions that would be needed to
satisfy the Court’s population cap cannot be achieved unless the
Court alters state law, dictates the adoption of risky prison policies,
and orders the early release of inmates serving prison terms for
serious and violent felonies. The Court itself would need to take
these actions because Defendants are barred from adopting new
population-reduction measures by state law and the state
constitution. Some of these prohibitions can only be changed by a
supermajority of the Legislature or by voter initiative. 340

Similarly, Governor Brown has stated in press interviews that he
“wants to respect the law of California, what the people have enacted
or the Legislature.” 341 These assertions, though, cloak policy decisions
in the false mantle of constitutional and statutory imperative. It is true
that reforms like those proposed in this Article to change some
wobblers and non-serious, non-violent felonies to misdemeanors would
require changing existing statutes. And, as noted previously, directly
extending reforms like those accomplished by Proposition 36’s
amendment of the Three Strikes laws to second-strikers as well would
indeed require a constitutional amendment.
Yet it is also true that Realignment itself required hundreds of
amendments to the California Penal Code, and another ballot initiative
authored, financed, and championed by the Brown administration
(Proposition 30, enacted by voters in the November 2012 election) was
required to provide constitutionally-protected funding. 342 Sentencing
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. California Challenges Federal Oversight of Prisons, KQED, supra note 207.
342. See Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 30, at sec. 3(d), CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-lawsv2.pdf#nameddest=prop30 (“This measure gives constitutional protection to the shift of
local public safety programs from state to local control and the shift of state revenues to
local government to pay for those programs.”); CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 36(b)–(c) (Section
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reform would also be possible if the political leadership in Sacramento
pushed as hard in the Legislature and with the public as they did to
enact and fund Realignment. The choice not to do so is just that: a
political choice, not an externally imposed mandate. As we
demonstrate in the next Section, all too often in Sacramento such
political choices are dictated by powerful law enforcement interests
perennially opposed to sentencing reform.
1. Tales from the Legislative Trenches: Two Modest Sentencing
Reform Proposals Defeated by Law Enforcement
a.

SB 1506 To Reduce the Penalty for Personal Possession
of Small Amounts of Controlled Substances

In the 2011–2012 legislative session, Senator Mark Leno (D-San
Francisco) introduced Senate Bill 1506, which proposed to add
California to the list of thirteen states, 343 the District of Columbia, and
the federal government currently treating possession of drugs for
personal use as a misdemeanor rather than a felony or a wobbler.344
Longer sentences have never been demonstrated to effectively deter or
limit drug abuse. 345 Instead, research conducted by the Justice Policy
Institute shows that states, and the District of Columbia, charging drug
possession as a misdemeanor have higher rates of treatment admissions
and slightly lower rates of illicit drug use than states charging it as a
felony. 346 This bill would have saved state and county governments a
36 was added on November 6, 2012 by initiative proposition 30).; Marisa Lagos and Wyatt
Buchanan, Much More Rides on Prop. 30 than Schools, SF CHRON. (Nov. 3, 2012),
available at http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Much-more-rides-on-Prop-30-than-schools4006526.php; Kevin Yamamura, Funding Fight On if Prop. 30 Fails, SACRAMENTO BEE
(Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://www.sacbee.com/2012/10/23/4930852/funding-fight-onif-prop-30-fails.html.
343. Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4763 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.401(5) (West 2014); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 1107-A (C-F), 1252 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
94C, § 34 (West 2014); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-29-139(c) (West 2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
220.03 (McKinney 2014); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 780-113(a)(1), (b) (West 2014); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-53-370(c) (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-418(a), (c) (West 2014);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4231-4235a (West 2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-4-401(c)
(West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.41(3g) (West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-71031(c)(1) (West 2014).
344. See D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(d)(1) (West 2014); 21 U.S.C.A. § 844 (West 2014).
345. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY 7
(Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08_01_REP_DrugTx_AC-PS.pdf.
346. Id. at 2. Unlike California where the punishment for possession of drugs, other than
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billion dollars over five years 347 and allowed communities to preserve
jail space for people who pose a risk to public safety. 348 The
Legislative Analyst’s Office estimated that SB 1506 would have
resulted in “an annual savings of nearly $160 million for counties and
just over $64 million for the state.” 349 It also would have reduced “the
average daily state prison population by about 2,200 people and the
average daily county jails population by 2,000 people.” 350 Finally, SB
1506 would have reduced recidivism by eliminating the lifetime
barriers to employment, housing, and education that accompany felony
convictions. 351
marijuana, is typically a felony, 13 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government treat all drug possession as a misdemeanor. See C.R.S. §§ 18-18-404, 18-18403.5, 18-1.3-501, 18-1.3-401, An Act Concerning Reduction of Sentences for Particular
Drug Crimes, and, in connection therewith, Creating a Drug Offender Treatment Fund, S.B.
03-318, Session Laws of 2003, First Regular Session of the 64th General Assembly, ch. 424
§ 1; DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 4206, DEL. CODE tit. 16, §§ 4763, 4767, An Act to Amend Titles
10, 11, 16 and 21 of the Delaware Code Relating to Drug-Involved Offenses, H.B. 19,
Second Regular Session of the 146th General Assembly ch. 13 (2011); IOWA CODE §§
124.401(5), 903.1; 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1101, 1103, 1107-A, 1252; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94c §
34, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 274 § 1; MISS. CODE § 41-29-139(c)(1); N.Y. PENAL CODE §§
70.70, 220.03, 220.06, 220.09; 35 PA. STAT. § 780-113(a)(1), (b); S.C. CODE §§ 44-53370(c), (d); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-418, 39-17-419, 40-35-11; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 4231, 4233; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1; W. VA. CODE §§ 60A-4-401(c), 60A-4-407,
60A-4-408; WIS. STAT. § 961.41(3g); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-7-1030, 35-7-1031, 35-7-1032,
35-7-1033, 35-7-1038; MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW §§ 5-601(c), 5-614(a); N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d),
15A-1340.17, O.R.C. §§ 2925.11(C), 2925.01(D), 2929.14(A)(5); V.T.C. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 481.115, 481. 102, V.T.C. PENAL CODE § 12.35; D.C. CODE § 48904.01(d)(1), (e); 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a), 841, 18 U.S.C. § 3607. Moreover, drug crime is not
higher in those states. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN.,
STATE REPORTS ON ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND ILLEGAL DRUG USE (2007), available at
http://oas.samhsa.gov/statesList.cfm.
347. See Letter from Mac Taylor, Legislative Analyst, to Mark Leno, California State
Sen. (Feb. 28, 2012) (on file with the office of Sen. Leno); see also Leno Bill Revises
Penalty for Simple Drug Possession, CAL. STATE SEN. MARK LENO (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/2012-02-27-leno-bill-revises-penalty-simple-drug-possession
[hereinafter Leno Bill].
348. S.B. 1506, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
349. See Wyatt Buchanan, Calif. Bill would ease drug possession penalties, SF GATE
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Calif-bill-would-ease-drug-possessionpenalties-3490103.php#ixzz2KbheUqXn; see also Leno Bill, supra note 347 (“The
Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates reducing penalties for drug possession will save
counties about $159 million annually, in addition to yearly savings for the State totaling
$64.4 million.”).
350. Id.
351. See CHRISTY VISHER, SARA DEBUS & JENNIFER YAHNER, JUSTICE POLICY CTR.,
EMPLOYMENT AFTER PRISON: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RELEASES IN THREE STATES,
(Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411778_employment_after_prison.pdf
(study
indicating that inmates who were employed and earning higher wages after release were less

HOPPER FINAL

602

8/21/2014 4:04 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 54

b. SB 210: Reforming Pre-Trial Detention Practices to
Allow More Individuals Charged with Non-Violent, NonSerious Offenses to Be Released From Jail While
Awaiting Their Day in Court
SB 210, introduced in the 2011–2012 legislative session by
Senator Loni Hancock (D-Oakland), would have provided a framework
whereby pretrial detainees, whom the court determines present a
minimal risk to public safety, could be released to community
supervision while they await trial—instead of taking up jail space
because they cannot afford bail. 352 As discussed above, the vast
majority of people in county jails statewide on any given day are being
held pretrial.353 A significant portion of these individuals remain in jail
awaiting their day in court, not because they present a risk to public
safety, but because they cannot afford to pay bail.354 Notably, Latino
and black defendants are more likely than white defendants to be held
in jail because of an inability to post bail. 355 SB 210 would have simply
required judges to consider whether defendants were appropriate for
community monitoring even if they could not afford bail. 356
Jurisdictions across the country—including some counties in
California—have implemented similar reforms and, as a result, have
been able to avoid or reduce jail overcrowding while protecting public
safety and saving tax dollars. 357
2. Thwarting Reform: The Law Enforcement Lobby
Opposition from the District Attorneys’, Sheriffs’, and Police
Chiefs’ Associations defeated these bills. 358 Sen. Leno reintroduced a

likely to return to prison the first year out); see also CROSSROADS, supra note 138, app. C
(explaining how research has demonstrated that employment is a key factor in reducing
recidivism).
352. S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
353. Sixty-two percent of people in California jails are unsentenced. See JPS, supra note
112.
354. Id.
355. Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and
Outcomes: A comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 873, 877 (2003).
356. S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., Senate Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 1506, 2011–
2012 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_1501-1550/sb_1506_cfa_20120416_121628_sen_comm.html; Assembly
Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (July 2, 2012),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0201-
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compromise version of SB 1506 in the 2013–2014 legislative session.
The new bill, SB 649, would have reduced the felony drug possession
offenses in the original bill to wobblers, rather than misdemeanors as
proposed in SB 1506. 359 The compromise version was again opposed
by the District Attorneys’, Sheriffs’, and Police Chiefs’
Associations. 360 This time, despite this opposition, SB 649 was
approved by the Senate and the Assembly and sent to Governor Brown
for his signature. The Governor, however, vetoed the bill. 361
Other commentators have thoroughly documented the ways in
which this powerful law enforcement lobby has aggressively fought
virtually any proposal to reform state sentencing laws over the past
forty years. 362 Throughout the country, law enforcement special
interests and politicians have manipulated the public’s fear of crime to
justify ever-harsher punishment, longer sentences, and more prisons
and jails. 363 California illustrates this dynamic perhaps better than any

0250/sb_210_cfa_20120702_100001_asm_comm.html (not surprisingly, SB 210, the
pretrial release reform bill, was also opposed by the private bail bond industry); Senate
Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 649, 2012–2013 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 17,
2013),
available
at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_06010650/sb_649_cfa_20130422_095056_sen_comm.html.
359. See S.B. 1506, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
360. See Senate Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 649, supra note 327;
Assembly Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 649, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess.
(June 12, 2013), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_06010650/sb_649_cfa_20130612_155938_asm_comm.html.
361. Veto Message for S.B. 649, 2012–2013 Reg. Sess. (Oct. 12, 2013), available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0601-0650/sb_649_vt_20131012.html.
362. See, e.g., JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE
PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2011) (describing the history of the California
prison guards’ union (CCPOA) and the ways in which their political influence grew
markedly with prison expansion, making them a powerful force in California politics able to
repeatedly defeat attempts to reform state sentencing laws); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL.,
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 3–16
(2001) (describing law enforcement lobby’s role in defeating numerous attempts to revise
the most draconian elements of the state’s “Three Strikes” law shows); Michael C.
Campbell, Politics, Prisons, and Law Enforcement: An Examination of the Emergence of
“Law and Order” Politics in Texas, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 661–62 (2011) (describing
how groups affiliated with law enforcement have emerged as some of the most active
opponents of recent efforts by California to reduce overcrowding by releasing qualified
inmates early).
363. See, e.g., BARKER, supra note 59, at 81–83 (The author describes how Crime
Victims United of California (CVUC), a political action committee made up of crime
victims groups, law enforcement organizations, and high-profile state officials such as the
governor and attorney general led a successful campaign against Proposition 66, a 2004
ballot initiative seeking to reform the state’s harsh Three Strikes law, “based on fear and
loathing. They tapped into the public’s fear of random violence, its sense of victimization
and insecurity about crime, moral outrage about child molesters and sex offenders. . . .”); see
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other state. As one former state Senator stated in June 2011, “There’s a
political paralysis here—people are afraid . . . of being labeled soft on
crime, so they legislate by sound bite.” 364 Michael Jacobson, the
Executive Director of the Vera Institute of Justice, 365 explained in
2008:
Meaningful prison reform has eluded the state for decades, already
resulting in a federal takeover of the state prison’s medical system
and a pending federal takeover of the rest of the system. Why the
California correctional system has grown so fast and become so
overcrowded and violent is the subject for another article. Suffice it
to say that because the politics of crime in California are so
difficult and involve so many powerful interest groups, including
the state’s district attorneys, the California Correctional Peace
Officers Association, victims’ rights groups, and police chiefs,
along with a wide political split between Democratic and
Republican legislators on matters of crime policy, achieving
consensus on reform proposals has proven impossible. Add in all
the public referenda toughening sentences over the last few years,
and you end up with a toxic political mix, which has to date
366
prevented any serious reform of this behemoth system.

Similarly, the Center for Juvenile and Criminal Justice explained in a
2011 report on the influence of the law enforcement lobby on
California incarceration rates:
Both driving the decades long changes in incarceration rates and
severity of the sentences handed out, and also seeking to take
advantage of them, is a network of special interest groups,
professional associations, and Sacramento-based lobbyists. Groups
such as the California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association
(CCPOA); the Police Chiefs Association; the Sheriffs Association;
the District Attorneys Association (CDAA); Crime Victims United

also SIMON, JONATHAN, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 75–110
(2007); Campbell, supra note 362, at 632. (“Law enforcement groups enjoy a privileged
degree of public legitimacy, and, as the successful defeat of California’s attempts to revise
the most draconian elements of the state’s “Three Strikes” law shows, are often unwilling to
compromise on policies widely regarded as ineffective in dealing with crime.”).
364. Marisa Lagos, Political Will for Reform is Lacking: California Lags Behind in
Reducing Incarceration, SF CHRON, June 13, 2011, at 1a.
365. The Vera Institute is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit center for justice policy
and practice, with offices in New York City, Washington, DC, and New Orleans. Vera’s
projects and reform initiatives, typically conducted in partnership with local, state, or
national officials, are located across the United States and around the world.
366. Michael Jacobson, Crisis and Opportunity in California’s Prison System, 13
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 319, 320 (2008).
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(CVU); and the Peace Officers Research Association of California
(PORAC)—which puts out policy papers and other materials
advocating for particular criminal justice changes—have spent
millions of dollars over the years influencing elections, lobbying
for and against specific policies, and, endorsing and donating to
candidates who offer them favorable employment contracts and the
367
chance to expand their membership roles.

While on the one hand, many county officials have decried the
additional burdens Realignment places upon local criminal justice
systems, elected Sheriffs, District Attorneys, and Police Chiefs from
those same counties have, through their lobbyists in Sacramento,
opposed the very reforms necessary to make Realignment work better
and to reduce the pressures on local jails. 368
The statewide law enforcement associations are likely to continue
to oppose sentencing reforms like those proposed in this Article.
Indeed, without the external countervailing pressure on the State from
the Plata litigation, it is unlikely that Realignment would ever have
been enacted in the first place.
C. Public Support for Reform
Recent public opinion polls demonstrate that Californians across
the state and across the political spectrum overwhelmingly support
smart-on-crime policies, including alternatives to incarceration for
many low-level offenses, and especially for people who are awaiting
trial and who pose little risk to public safety. 369 Nationally, nearly twothirds of Americans, across almost all demographic groups, support
moving away from mandatory prison terms for non-violent drug
crimes. 370 California voters also strongly support the specific reforms
367. ABRAMSKY, supra note 46.
368. See, e.g., S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); Senate Committee on
Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 1506, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 16, 2012), available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_15011550/sb_1506_cfa_20120416_121628_sen_comm.html (demonstrating that District
Attorneys, Police, and Sheriffs associations were opposed to the bill); Assembly Committee
on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (July 2, 2012), available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_02010250/sb_210_cfa_20120702_100001_asm_comm.html
(demonstrating that
District
Attorneys, Police, and Sheriffs associations were opposed to the bill).
369. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY: AN
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ASSESSMENT (Sept. 27, 2012), available at
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file861_10684.pdf [hereinafter
REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY].
370. Carroll Doherty, Juliana Menasce Horowitz & Rob Suls, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, Two-Thirds Favor Treatment, Not Jail, for Use of

HOPPER FINAL

606

8/21/2014 4:04 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 54

that died in the Legislature during the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013
sessions. According to data from Tulchin Research surveys conducted
in May and September 2012, 7 out of 10 likely voters favor allowing
courts to require monitoring in the community instead of jail for those
who cannot afford to post bail. 371 Another seventy percent support
reducing the penalty for simple possession of a small amount of drugs
for personal use. 372
Californians are entirely more concerned with the state’s poor
economic condition, lack of jobs, the state budget, and cuts to
education than with crime and related issues. Barely 1 percent ranked
crime, drugs, gangs, and violence combined as the state’s most serious
problem. 373 Nearly 4 out of 5 voters (78 percent) believe that our
prisons and jails are overcrowded and we should look for alternatives,
while only 15 percent disagree. 374 When given a choice as to how to
spend law enforcement dollars, voters overwhelmingly prefer investing
in “more prevention and alternatives to jail for non-violent offenders”
than building “more prisons and jails” (75 percent compared with only
12 percent).375
Additionally, as noted above, California voters demonstrated, for
the first time in decades, widespread popular support for scaling back
some of the state’s harsh sentencing laws when they overwhelmingly
passed Proposition 36, revising the state’s 1994 Three Strikes
scheme. 376 Perhaps more remarkable than the overall margin of victory
for Prop. 36 (69.3 percent to 30.7 percent) is the fact that it garnered a
majority of votes in each of the state’s 58 counties; in most counties,
the “yes” vote was close to or more than 60 percent. 377
When voters demonstrate such strong support for evidence-based
public policy, elected officials must follow or be held accountable. 378
Heroin, Cocaine at 7–8 (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/04-0214%20Drug%20Policy%20Release.pdf [hereinafter America’s New Drug Policy
Landscape].
371. REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY, supra note 369.
372. Id.; America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, supra note 370, at 7–8.
373. See REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY, supra note 369.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. See Prop. 36, supra note 67.
377. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE NOVEMBER 6, 2012, GENERAL
ELECTION 68–69 (2012), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012general/sov-complete.pdf.
378. It’s Time to Revise Penalties for Simple Drug Possession, ACLU OF N. CAL.,
available
at
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/it’s_time_to_revise_penalties_for_simple_dr
ug_possession.shtml.
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CONCLUSION
Much of this Article has focused upon Realignment in the context
of the State’s attempts to comply with the population cap set by Plata.
But even if the State can achieve the three-judge courts’ 137.5 percent
population target through some combination of Realignment, SB 105,
additional funding to further expand prison capacity, and prisoner
release orders from the three-judge court’s Compliance Monitor,
California prisons will still be overflowing. It is important to remember
that the three-judge court set the 137.5 percent cap pursuant to the
PLRA, which requires significant federal deference to states’ decisions
about running their prison systems. 379 The court-ordered reduction may
well not be sufficient to end constitutionally prohibited cruel and
unusual punishment. 380 Even assuming that compliance with the Plata

379. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1945 (noting the “strong evidence” that a population limit
of 130% might be necessary to remedy the constitutional violations, while also
acknowledging the three-judge court’s finding that some upward adjustment from 130% was
warranted in light of “the caution and restraint required by the PLRA.”).
380. Id.; see also Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 960-963 (E.D. Cal.
2009) (“Finding that plaintiffs’ request for a cap of 130% was “reasonable and finds
considerable support in the record,” but also that there was “some evidence that a reduction
in the population to a level somewhat higher than 130% of the system’s design capacity …
might provide the relief from overcrowding necessary for the state to correct the
constitutional violations at issue.” (Emphasis added). In fact, California prisons remain
severely overcrowded, second only to Alabama’s. See Expert Declaration of Craig Haney at
12, 15, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 90–0520).
Specific prisons within the state continue to operate at extremely crowded levels—some at
over 170 percent of design capacity. See id.; CDCR, WEEKLY INSTITUTION/CAMPS
POPULATION
DETAIL
at
2
(May
7,
2014),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Weekly
Wed/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad140507.pdf. Moreover, even as the state prison system has
dropped over the course of the Plata litigation from nearly 190% of design capacity to
current levels, “there has been essentially no reduction in the overall mentally ill prisoner
population.” Expert Declaration of Craig Haney at 15, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.
Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 90–0520); see also Declaration of Michael W. Bien in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Amended Application and [Proposed] Order
at 2, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 90–0520)
(“Reductions to date in CDCR’s prison population have failed to benefit the Coleman
class.”). Prisoners are still suffering the symptoms and effects of crowding, including:
shortages of clinicians and custody officers; shortages of treatment space, recreation space
and specialized medical and mental health beds; and delays in access to care. See Expert
Declaration of Craig Haney at 14-17, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004
(E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 90–0520); Declaration of Michael W. Bien in Support of Plaintiffs’
Response to Defendants’ Amended Application and [Proposed] Order at 1, Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 90–0520). In addition, if, as
currently planned, the State chooses to build or rent its way into compliance with the 137.5
percent cap, it will end up with even more severe shortages of clinicians. See Plata, 131 S.
Ct. at 1939 (finding that overcrowding does not just mean a shortage of beds, but a lack of
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order will remedy the constitutional violations, this is a low bar.
California will still have tens of thousands more incarcerated than the
state’s prisons were designed to house. The standards for sound
criminal justice policy, effective corrections management, and basic
good government should be higher than simply meeting the bare
minimum required by the constitution. Complying with Plata ought to
be the beginning, not the end, of the conversation about reforming the
state’s criminal justice policies.
The public opinion research discussed above demonstrates that
among California voters, the politics of fear are giving way to new
demands for fiscal responsibility and effective government.
Californians want their elected representatives to be smart on crime and
are increasingly disenchanted with the billions spent each year
incarcerating those who commit low-level, non-violent crimes at the
expense of public health, college tuition, primary education, and the
overall economic health of the state. Voters, when asked which
candidate they would support for the legislature—a candidate who
supports pretrial release versus a candidate who opposes pretrial
release—prefer by a nearly 3-to-1 margin a candidate who supports this
reform (63 percent to 23 percent). 381 In addition, over half of all likely
voters would be more likely to vote for a state representative who
supported revising the penalty for simple possession of drugs from a
felony to a misdemeanor. 382
Legislators who continue to cater to the law enforcement lobby
risk more than just reelection. The state’s fiscal wellbeing and
community safety are at stake. The overly punitive sentencing laws and
prison expansion over the past decades are precisely what created the
current constitutional and fiscal incarceration crisis and led California
to its alarming recidivism rate.383
The Plata litigation and Realignment have ignited the most
significant criminal justice policy debate in California in decades. But

resources necessary to address the fundamental needs of prisoners); Coleman, 922 F. Supp.
2d at 954-55 (holding that merely adding beds will not address the principal effects of
overcrowding).
381. REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY, supra note 369.
382. Id.
383. See supra Section III.B. Higher rates of incarceration and longer sentences do little,
if anything, to reduce crime. See supra note 70. Indeed, imprisonment has a
“criminogenic”—crime producing—effect, and the more time served the more likely one is
to offend again. Craig Haney, Prison Effects of in the Age of Mass Incarceration, THE
PRISON J. 15 (Jan. 25, 2012), available at
http://tpj.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/09/11/0032885512448604.
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thus far the practical impact has fallen fall short of the paradigm shift
some predicted. Paradigm shifts never come without considerable
disruption and often are hard-fought. Whether future historians will
decide Realignment marked such a turning point in California criminal
justice policies depends upon whether the state’s political leaders are
willing to reform the harsh sentencing laws that caused the prison
overcrowding in the§ first place.

